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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**BORDER JUMPING: STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN PLANNING CROSS-BORDER
RAIDS AGAINST INSURGENT SANCTUARIES**

by

George E. Berndt

June 2013

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IN PLANNING CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AGAINST INSURGENT
SANCTUARIES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Cross-border ground raids by state-backed security forces can have a detrimental impact on guerrillas' ability to wage war. External support in neighboring countries can be an important source of strength to insurgent forces. However, cross-border raids and their security gains come at a political cost. This thesis examines the conflicts in Malaya (1946–1950), Nicaragua (1981–1990), Algeria (1954–1962), Namibia (1960–1989), South Vietnam (1960–1975), and Afghanistan (1978–1992) to identify operational and strategic-level considerations in planning cross-border operations to reduce the political costs of such operations. The study examines the relationship between security gains and political costs, including subsets of factors intrinsic to both variables. The research presents lessons applicable to the contemporary counterterrorism environment and suggests how military and political counterinsurgents can combine lines of effort in conducting cross-border operations against external insurgent sanctuaries.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	1
A.	RESEARCH QUESTION	2
B.	PURPOSE AND SCOPE.....	2
C.	FRAMEWORK.....	2
D.	METHODOLOGY	7
II.	MALAYA (1948–1960).....	13
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	13
B.	GOVERNMENT-BACKED CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY	14
C.	OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION	15
D.	DURATION.....	16
E.	OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE.....	16
F.	BRITISH POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS- BORDER RAIDS	17
G.	TIMING OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO THAILAND	19
H.	THE TERMINATION OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS INTO THAILAND	19
I.	SUMMARY	20
III.	NICARAGUA (1981–1990).....	21
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	21
B.	THE DYNAMICS OF SANDINISTA CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY GAINS	22
C.	THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND POLITICAL COSTS	25
D.	THE OVERALL TIMING OF NICARAGUAN CROSS-BORDER OFFENSIVES	27
E.	THE TERMINATION OF NICARAGUAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS	27
F.	SUMMARY	28
IV.	ALGERIAN INDEPENDENCE (1954–1962)	29
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	29
B.	FRENCH ATTEMPTS AT ISOLATION	30
C.	OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION, DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE IN THE FRENCH- ALGERIAN PARADIGM.....	31
D.	FRENCH POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS- BORDER RAIDS	32
E.	STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION	33
F.	DURATION AND FORCE SIZE	33
G.	NATIONAL WILL	34
H.	THE TIMING OF FRENCH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS	34
I.	SUMMARY	35

V.	NAMIBIA (1960–1989).....	37
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	37
B.	GOVERNMENT-BACKED CROSS BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY.....	38
C.	OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION.....	39
D.	DURATION.....	40
E.	OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE.....	40
F.	SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.....	41
G.	STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION.....	41
H.	DURATION AND FORCE SIZE.....	42
I.	NATIONAL WILL.....	43
J.	THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS IN NAMIBIA.....	43
K.	SUMMARY.....	44
VI.	SOUTH VIETNAM (1960–1975).....	45
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	45
B.	AMERICAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY.....	47
C.	OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION.....	50
D.	DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE.....	51
E.	AMERICAN POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.....	52
F.	STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION.....	53
G.	DURATION AND FORCE SIZE.....	55
H.	NATIONAL WILL.....	56
I.	THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF AMERICAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS.....	57
J.	SUMMARY.....	58
VII.	AFGHANISTAN (1978–1992).....	63
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	63
B.	SOVIET CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY.....	64
C.	OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION.....	65
D.	DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE.....	65
E.	SOVIET POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.....	67
F.	STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION.....	67
G.	DURATION AND FORCE SIZE.....	68
H.	NATIONAL WILL.....	68
I.	THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF SOVIET CROSS-BORDER RAIDS IN PAKISTAN.....	69
J.	SUMMARY.....	69
VIII.	CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.....	73
A.	CHARACTERISTICS OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND POLITICAL COST REDUCTION LESSONS.....	73

B.	THE TIMING OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.....	78
C.	INTERNAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS	79
D.	EXTERNAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS	81
E.	INTERNAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS	83
F.	EXTERNAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS	84
G.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	85
APPENDIX: CASE STUDY SELECTION		89
LIST OF REFERENCES		93
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		99

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Dichotomy Scale.....	3
Figure 2.	Subcategories of Politics.....	4
Figure 3.	Security Environment	6
Figure 4.	Time: Returns Versus Duration	7
Figure 5.	Map of Algeria Showing Border Fortifications	36
Figure 6.	MACVSOG Areas of Operations in Laos	59
Figure 7.	Military Special Operations: Areas of Command and Control.....	60
Figure 8.	Cambodian Campaign, Fishhook, and Parrot's Beak	61
Figure 9.	Sanctuaries on the Afghanistan/Pakistan Border.	71
Figure 10.	Parrot's Beak Region on Afghanistan/Pakistan Border.....	72
Figure 11.	Applied Security Environment	77
Figure 12.	Applied Political Environment	78
Figure 13.	Strategic and Operational Implications.....	79
Figure 14.	Logic for Assignment of Case Outcomes	89

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Select Non-Viable Cases.....	10
Table 2.	Viable Case Studies for Analysis.....	11
Table 3.	Security/Political Cost Lessons: Malaya (1948–1960).....	73
Table 4.	Security/Political Cost Lessons: Nicaragua (1981–1990)	74
Table 5.	Security/Political Cost Lessons: Algeria (1954–1962).....	74
Table 6.	Security/Political Cost Lessons: Namibia (1960–1989)	75
Table 7.	Security/Political Cost Lessons: South Vietnam (1960–1975).....	75
Table 8.	Security/Political Cost Lessons: Afghanistan (1978–1992)	76
Table 9.	The 89 Insurgencies and Case Selection Criteria	91

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1 RAR	1 st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment
2 RAR	2 nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces (anti-Ugandan government)
ALN	Armée de Libération Nationale
ARDE	Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BLC	Batallón de Lucha Cazador
BLI	Batallón de Lucha Irregular
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Communist Terrorist
F3EA	Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front
GIA	Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MACSOG	Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MACVSOG	Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MiG	Mikoyan and Gurevich Aircraft Corporation
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLA	Malayan National Liberation Army
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MRLA	Malayan Races Liberation Army
NPA	New People's Army

NVA	North Vietnamese Army
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time
RAF	British Royal Air Force
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SADF	South African Defense Force
SALT II	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II
SAP	South African Police
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOG	Studies and Observation Group
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
UDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Union
UN	United Nations
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VC	Viet Cong

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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Attacking insurgent sanctuaries with ground forces across international borders is often thought of as “a bridge too far,” but in fact such attacks can be only a decision away. On 30 March 1986, the 334th and the 154th Spetsnaz battalions crossed the border into Pakistan in order to attack a Mujahedeen base camp.¹ After fierce fighting by both sides, on 2 April, Soviet forces withdrew completely from the battlefield after failing to locate two missing Russian soldiers. Casualty figures from both sides are inaccurate, but Mujahedeen losses were anywhere from 33 to 300 killed and 40 wounded, while Soviet losses are believed to be at least 60 killed, with two missing in action. The operation itself was not sanctioned by higher levels of Soviet military leadership. However, overt political objections from Pakistan were minimal, with only a brief synopsis of events outlined in the *Pakistani Strategic Studies Review* and no political backlash.

Other nations have also used cross-border ground raids to attack insurgent havens.² While such raids can be operationally beneficial, they can entail political costs. It appears that cross-border raids can undermine the counterinsurgents’ legitimacy, as in the tribal areas of Pakistan in recent years. These incidents highlight the delicate operational and political implications of cross-border raids. On one hand, ground raids can reduce the sustainability of an insurgency by removing insurgent sanctuaries. On the other hand, they can result in restrictive political consequences that compromise the counterinsurgents’ freedom of movement and political legitimacy. This thesis examines how cross-border raids can be conducted to improve counterinsurgency efforts while minimizing negative political consequences.

¹ Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta: Spetsnaz Strike into Pakistan During the Soviet-Afghan War,” accessed 10 August 2012, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Krer-SOF.pdf>. This account can also be found in Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “Vignette 12 – Krer One” and “Vignette 13 – Krer Two,” in *The Other Side of The Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics In The Soviet-Afghan War*, Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1999, 327–334.

² See Table 9 in the Appendix for a list of observed cross-border raids between 1945 and 2002.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

What are the key strategic and operational considerations when planning and executing cross-border ground raids against insurgent sanctuaries?

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to identify strategic and operational considerations that maximize the effectiveness of cross-border raids during counterinsurgency conflicts. This same logic will be applied in order to decide when *not* to conduct cross-border raids. This study focuses on insurgencies that began and ended between 1945 and 2002. This time period encompasses the rise of airpower as a viable means of attacking remote internal insurgent sanctuaries, bringing to the forefront questions of violation of national sovereignty. Such operations can have far-reaching consequences outside the context of a regional conflict. Cases include examples with varying degrees of similarity between actors and regions in order to identify similarities across different environments.

C. FRAMEWORK

The fundamental approach to the research question is to correlate the sub-fields within political costs and security gains from a set of case studies, and then extrapolate and analyze the strategic and operational considerations in order to identify themes. In order to determine whether cross-border raids against insurgent safe havens are effective, an understanding of the social and military dynamics are necessary for framing the primary categories of implications. For the purpose of this thesis, politics and the security environment are the two primary categories for judging the applicability and effectiveness of cross-border raids. These two categories account for the larger strategic implications within a national political framework and in developing preferred operational considerations in the counterinsurgent theater of war. These two variables are also operational variables for analyzing the operational environment within the U.S. Army Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical

Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT) model which is “critical to developing a counterinsurgency plan that can defeat the insurgency.”³

In defining the political and security environments, with the emphasis on security, it is necessary to understand the balance between political cost and security gain. One is inverse of the other, in that a stake in one will order a cost in the other. The balance between the two interests can make one less costly at the expense of the other, depending on the environment of the decision maker in a given situation. Figure 1 displays the expected tradeoff between the political cost and the security gain. The line of equilibrium can become more steep, or less, depending on the context of the conflict. The aim of this thesis is to identify strategic and political considerations that can lower the slope. The lower the slope, the more security gains for less political cost.




Figure 1. The Dichotomy Scale⁴

In order to identify a set of optimal strategic political considerations, four subcategories are used to classify utility. First, national will is measured in order to correlate popular support for the sitting policy makers in the conduct of the conflict. It is initially hypothesized that as popular support grows, the likelihood that policy makers

³ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2009), 1-3.

⁴ Political cost is a sitting government's lack of domestic or international legitimacy affecting its ability to govern and wage a just war. Security gains are those actions which reduce the violence against an indigenous population supported by the government or against the government's forces.

will take bolder actions increases. Second, information is defined as the information linking a particular objective to the conflict. The more effectively an over-the-border objective is linked to the counterinsurgency effort, the more the administration is justified in conducting a raid against the site. However, dissemination of information must be controlled. If too much negative information is generated as a result of the operation, it can have negative effects. The third subcategory is duration. When examining cross-border raids, duration is the overall time spent conducting such operations within the larger context of the conflict. The tradeoff here can be that too little time spent on the operation may have little or no impact on the overall campaign, while too much time spent across the border can lead to cries of occupation, or war expansion. The fourth sub-component, force size, is similar in this respect. Too large a force can lead to concern about resource expenditure and threat of a wider war, and too little can invite criticism of internal political posturing and manipulation. The psychological impact of cross-border raids cannot be ignored. However, it is not included in the scope of this thesis because sources to make viable comparisons are not available. Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the projected correlation between these factors and political returns.




Figure 2. Subcategories of Politics

The security environment can be characterized by a similar subset of categories (Figure 3). Operational and tactical information are intertwined and depend on good intelligence collection. The more information available to an operational command, the more likely their cross-border operations will reduce violence in the contested region. This study does not address the relationship between intelligence collection and time (time-sensitive intelligence with an expiration date) because this thesis does not focus on single tactical actions. However, the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze (F3EA) model is applicable to the current investigation, and its application to intelligence analysis is addressed.⁵

The operational area is related to the issue of war expansion. At some point the number of cross-border sites attacked will push the insurgent force off-balance. However, if an expedition is too large, the insurgent force will simply relocate, thus nullifying the effectiveness of cross-border raids. As the insurgent force retreats into other sanctuaries, the state force can be portrayed as invading a neighboring country. Mission duration and force size have similar second and third-order effects. If duration is too short, or force size too small, the counterinsurgency will produce negligible impacts. If the force is too large or the duration too long, the excessive damage, both material and human, will outweigh the objective of the operation, causing more harm than good.

⁵ William Rosenau and Austin Long, *The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. The description of F3EA is drawn from Raymon T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio, "ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 50 (Third Quarter 2008), pp. 51–55, and from Michael Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas Cantrell, "Employing ISR SOF Best Practices," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 50 (Third Quarter 2008), p. 57.




Figure 3. Security Environment

Time is the final factor analyzed across the political and security realms. Time is objectively measured as the occurrence of cross-border raids within the larger time frame of the conflict. The study describes whether cross-border raids were conducted in the early, middle, or late stages of the conflict, and correlates the timing with political and security returns. Figure 4 displays hypothesized returns over time. Raids conducted too early may affect the national political narrative and early accusations of war expansion. Raids conducted late in a campaign can deliver the final blow to a failing insurgency but late raids in the context of a failing campaign may not halt the insurgents' momentum.




Figure 4. Time: Returns Versus Duration

D. METHODOLOGY

Eighty-nine insurgencies described in a RAND Counterinsurgency (COIN) study were reviewed for possible inclusion in this thesis.⁶ The following criteria defined classification as an insurgency.

1. The fighting was between states and non-state actors seeking control of a government or region or to use violence to change government policies.
2. At least 1,000 people were killed over the course of the conflict, with yearly averages of at least 100 deaths.
3. At least 100 people were killed on both sides, including civilians attacked by rebels.
4. The conflicts were not coups, countercoups, or insurrections.

An additional requirement for inclusion in this study is the use of cross-border raids. A cross-border raid is defined as the deliberate violation of an international border by a government-supported assault force against an insurgent sanctuary. This study focuses on cross-border raids that use ground troops, as these are usually considered more serious

⁶ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010). The list was drawn from Martin C. Libicki, “Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings,” in David C. Gompert, *et al.*, *War by Other Means – Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Final Report* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).

violations of national sovereignty. Also, ground assault forces have the capability to exploit intelligence findings on the objective. Strikes by government supported aircraft are excluded because airstrikes cannot adequately exploit intelligence gathered on the ground, nor can they influence local populations through interpersonal relations. Ongoing counterinsurgencies that are not part of the RAND COIN study list are excluded because they take place after 2002 and thus fall outside the time frame established for this research. Recent ongoing insurgencies are included in Table 9, in the Appendix, and may be of interest to other researchers.

When a warring party resides within the borders of a nation-state or a third-party neighbor, the sovereignty violation is arguably not as severe as the cases examined in this study. If the two parties are already at war, border violations are a predictable consequence of their armed conflict. This thesis identifies whether cross-border raids in the 89 insurgencies met the “three-party rule.” The three-party criterion for case selection is that a third country (country A, effectively an external actor) is fighting an insurgency in country B, in support of country B’s inhabitants, and conducts a cross-border raid into country C.

Consideration of cross-border raids also involves scrutinizing decisions *not* to conduct cross-border raids. Such decisions are more difficult to evaluate because documentation and sources are more limited. To deal with this difficulty, this thesis discusses public discussion of cross-border raids and public support for hostilities. Public attitudes toward raids and the hostilities in general show the context of military and political decision-making. Accordingly, this study examines the impact on cross-border raids of public support as revealed in polls and other indicators of opinion.

For each case, the RAND researchers identified a government “win,” a “mixed outcome,” or a “government loss.” The win/mixed outcome/loss determination by the RAND study is as follows.

First, for each case, we asked whether the government against which the insurgency arose had stayed in power through the end of the conflict and whether it retained sovereignty over the region of conflict. If insurgents either deposed (or otherwise led to the fall of) the government or won de facto control of a separatist region, then the COIN force did not win. If the government remained in power and the country remained intact, then we

further considered whether the government had been forced to (or chose to) make major concessions to the insurgents, such as power sharing or loss of territory or other sovereign control, or was otherwise forced to yield to insurgent demands. If the government stayed in power, the country remained intact, and no major concessions were granted to the insurgents, then the COIN force unambiguously won. If, however, major concessions were made, then the outcome was mixed. In all cases, what constituted a “major” concession and who (the COIN force or the insurgents) had the better of a mixed outcome was decided at the discretion of the individual case analyst and was based on the distinct narrative of that case.⁷

The decision tree is presented in Figure 8, in the Appendix.⁸ This thesis analyzes cases of cross-border raids with all three possible outcomes (government wins, mixed outcomes, and government losses). The cases are chosen from among those with adequate research material available from English language sources.

The characteristics of cross-border raids are isolated to permit identification of key decision making points and conditions in which cross-border raids are most and least effective. The research does not assume that cross-border raids are the only determinant of success or failure in an insurgent conflict.

The best case studies were identified by excluding non-viable cases that fail to meet the three-party rule or are currently ongoing. The following insurgencies were excluded for those reasons.

Insurgency	Start Year	End Year	Insurgency	Start Year	End Year
Philippines (HUK Rebellion)	1946	1955	Kosovo	1996	1999
Burma	1948	2006	Nepal	1997	2006
Kenya	1952	1956	Congo (anti-Kabila)	1998	2003
Indonesia (Daru Islam)	1958	1960	China	1934	1950
Lebanon	1958	1959	Cuba	1953	1959
Tibet	1959	1974	Eritrea	1960	1993
Congo/Katanga	1960	1965	South Africa	1960	1994
Guatemala	1960	1996	Angolan Independence	1962	1974
Iraq Kurdistan	1961	1974	Guinea-Bissau	1962	1974
Uruguay	1963	1973	Mozambique Independence	1962	1974

⁷ Paul, Clarke, and Grill, *Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 8.

⁸ Paul, *Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 9.

Biafran Secession	1967	1970	Zimbabwe	1965	1980
Argentina	1968	1979	Cambodia	1968	1975
Northern Ireland	1969	1999	Bangladesh	1971	1972
Jordan	1970	1971	Nicaragua	1978	1979
Philippines (MNLF)	1971	1996	Somalia	1980	1991
Balochistan	1973	1977	Sudan (SPLA)	1984	2004
Morocco	1975	1991	Liberia	1989	1997
Indonesia (Aceh)	1976	2005	Moldova	1990	1992
Philippines (MILF)	1977	2006	Rwanda	1990	1994
Peru	1981	1992	Afghanistan (post-Soviet)	1992	1996
Uganda (ADF)	1986	2000	Afghanistan (Taliban)	1996	2001
Algeria (GIA)	1992	2004	Zaire (anti-Mobutu)	1996	1997
Croatia	1992	1995	Colombia (FARC)	1963	Ongoing
Colombia (La Violencia)	1948	1962	Philippines (NPA)	1969	Ongoing
Yemen	1962	1970	India Northeast	1975	Ongoing
Dominican Republic	1965	1966	Sri Lanka	1976	Ongoing
East Timor	1975	2000	India-Naxalite	1980	Ongoing
Lebanese Civil War	1975	1990	Uganda (LRA)	1987	Ongoing
Kampuchea	1978	1992	Kashmir	1989	Ongoing
El Salvador	1979	1992	Nigeria (Niger Delta)	1991	Ongoing
Senegal	1980	2002	Somalian (post-Barre)	1991	Ongoing
Papua New Guinea	1988	1998	Chechnya II	1999	Ongoing
Bosnia	1992	1995	Israel	2000	Ongoing
Georgia/Abkhazia	1992	1994	Afghanistan (anti-Coalition)	2001	Ongoing
Nagorno-Karabakh	1992	1994	Ivory Coast	2002	Ongoing
Tajikistan	1992	1997	Darfur	2003	Ongoing
Burundi	1993	2003	Iraq	2003	Ongoing
Chechnya I	1994	1996	South Thailand	2004	Ongoing

Table 1. Select Non-Viable Cases

In addition, the use of airpower instead of ground troops disqualifies Greece 1945–1949, Angola (UNITA) 1975–2002, and Sierra Leone 1991–2002. The Indochina conflict from 1946 to 1954 is excluded because of its tie to colonialism, as well as the lack of clear national borders at the time of the campaign. Laos 1960–1975 is excluded because with numerous external actors, the case is too complex. Mozambique (RENAMO) 1976–1995 is eliminated because the insurgent force lacked sanctuaries outside of the conflict area. Finally, Turkey (PKK), 1984–1999, is omitted because

Kurdistan lies within the sovereign borders of Iraq and thus the case does not meet the three-party criterion. The remaining cases for analysis are presented in Table 2.

Insurgency	Start Year	End Year	External Sanctuaries	Cross-Border Raids	Three-Party Rule	Cross-Border Raids Considered	Literature	Result
Malaya	1948	1960	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Limited	Government Wins
Nicaragua (Contras)	1981	1990	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Limited	Mixed Outcome
Algerian Independence	1954	1962	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Moderate	Government Loses
Namibia	1960	1989	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Limited	Government Loses
South Vietnam	1960	1975	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Moderate	Government Loses
Afghanistan (Soviet)	1978	1992	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Limited	Government Loses

Table 2. Viable Case Studies for Analysis

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II. MALAYA (1948–1960)

The Malayan Emergency, fought between the Communists insurgents led by Chin Peng, and the British colonial Malayan government, is an example of an environment where cross-border raids were not instrumental to the cessation of hostilities within the larger counterinsurgency framework. The British/Malayan government victory was achieved through the application of policies internal to the borders of Malaya. This chapter describes the Malayan emergency and discusses the role of cross-border raids less developed nations with large internal sanctuaries.⁹

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Malayan Emergency began in March 1948 when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led by Chin Peng, began a campaign of terror and murder against the British and their Malayan partners in Malaya. Originally called the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), in February 1949 the guerrilla force was renamed the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in an effort to gain outside support by expanding the group's appeal to different ethnic groups. Throughout the Emergency, however, ethnic Chinese comprised more than 95 percent of the guerrilla force.¹⁰ In June 1948 the British declared a state of emergency. The Director of Operations, General Sir Harold Briggs, implemented what became known as the Briggs Plan, "to clear the country step by step, from South to North." The plan had four objectives: 1) dominate the populated areas to build a sense of complete security and increase information from all sources, 2) break up the Min Yuen, Chinese peasants sympathetic to the MRLA cause, within the populated areas, 3) isolate communist terrorists (CTs) from food and

⁹ Resources on the Malayan Emergency focus primarily on internal population control measures. The conduct of cross-border raids is not widely discussed in historical documents. However, British and Australian lessons learned in gathering intelligence against remote communist camps inside and outside Malaya during the Emergency are evident in the conflict between Malaya and Indonesia, 1964–1966. In this conflict British Special Air Service (SAS) forces played a central role in the successful cross-border operations as part of Operation Claret in Borneo. See Raffi Gregorian, "CLARET Operations and Confrontation, 1964–1966," *Conflict Quarterly* (Winter 1991): 46–72, accessed 14 February 2013, <http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/download/14933/16002>.

¹⁰ John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 49.

intelligence within populated areas, and 4) destroy the CTs by forcing them to attack government forces on the government's terms.¹¹ After Briggs' retirement in 1951, his plan was carried out by General Sir Gerald Templer. Successful population control, influence operations, government policies, command and control, and security forces adaptation to the operational environment brought an end to active hostilities on 31 July 1960.¹²

The geography of the Malay Peninsula limits the possibilities for external sanctuaries. Thailand in the north was the only external sanctuary for the CT forces. Initially, the remote Malayan jungle served as a refuge, but as Malaya was pacified, the safe havens in Thailand became crucial to CT survival. Chin Peng hid in Thailand during the Emergency and remained there until he signed the final peace accords on 2 December 1989.¹³ Influenced by the Americans and the British, Thailand cooperated with Malaya, and assisted in operations against CT sanctuaries.¹⁴

B. GOVERNMENT-BACKED CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY

Government raids from Malaya into Thailand were conducted by British and Australian forces from Malaya with cooperation from the Thai Police. In 1953, the MCP leadership, under pressure from the British population resettlement and food control measures, relocated to the Thai border region.¹⁵ A number of base camps there had been completed the year before.¹⁶ The population control measures in Malaya were having an

¹¹ Peter Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," in *Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966*, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 1996), 15.

¹² For Templer's implementation of Briggs's plan see Karl Hack, "The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand," in *Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on the Plural Peninsula*, ed. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 173, and Hack, "The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 3, 383.

¹³ Chin Peng, *My Side of History*, as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), 3.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, "Milestones: 1953–1960: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954," accessed 15 February 2013, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953–1960/SEATO>.

¹⁵ Hack, "The Long March to Peace," 173.

¹⁶ Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated The Communist Guerrillas 1948–1960* (London: Cassell, 2004), 189.

effect on the CT forces, making the Thai safe havens the MCP's last bastion. Chin Peng intended for MCP units to reside on the southern side of the border just inside Malaya, but intelligence reports of British offensive action forced MCP guerrillas into "the deep jungle across the border with Siam."¹⁷ There is little mention in the literature of cross-border operations, but it is clear that extensive planning and resourcing supported such operations. For example, Operation Eagle Swoop was a combined Australian/Thai operation to destroy a MCP base camp by aerial bombings followed by a ground assault.¹⁸

C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION

Intelligence operations by the British-led government forces, under the agency titled Special Branch, were exceptionally effective in gathering information on CTs throughout Malaya.¹⁹ However, the Thai/Malayan border was remote, and intelligence operations were not as effective as the efforts by Special Branch to implement the Briggs plan.²⁰ Some success was gained by Thai/British security force cooperation. In mid-February 1957, a CT surrendered to Thai police and provided detailed information on a CT camp that straddled the border with the bulk of the camp inside Thailand.²¹ This information spurred a combined operation between the Australian 2nd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) in Malaya and Thai police. A commonwealth force of 54 men established a base in northern Malaya on 19 May 1957 to begin reconnoitering for the MCP base camp. Their efforts, while unsuccessful, established a precedent for cooperation between the British and the Thais.

¹⁷ Hack, "The Long March to Peace," 176.

¹⁸ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 126.

¹⁹ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 120. Multiple sources cite numerous examples of "exceptionally accurate" Special Branch intelligence operations leading to the capture of CTs and CT leadership.

²⁰ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 154. Noel Barber in *The War of the Running Dogs* describes Special Branch "as the internal security department dealing with internal subversion, internal revolution and counter-espionage," 191.

²¹ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 126.

D. DURATION

Despite their initial lack of success, British forces continued to enter the area, extending the operation for over two months. In the second phase of the operation, 84 men from the Support Company of 2 RAR were inserted by helicopter two miles north of the Thai village of Bukit Perenggan.²² This resulted in a firefight that ultimately led to follow-on operations in the area lasting through mid-July. Australian forces continued to operate in the area with sporadic enemy contact. (Sources make no mention of Thai Police efforts.) In addition to operations by 2 RAR operations, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) conducted small-unit cross-border operations, most lasting nearly a month.²³ This was in addition to combined operations on the border between 1 RAR and the Thai Police.

E. OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE

The size of the area traversed by forces during the operation is not clear. It can be assumed that the operational area was wider than it was deep, because 2 RAR focused inside the southern Thai region, rather than moving deeper north into Thailand. The operational range of Thai Police is not recorded apart from descriptions of their daily activities in a few remote villages. Approximately 186 Australian troops participated in the first phase of Operation Eagle Swoop. The size of the force after 25 June, the start of Phase II, is unclear. Additional forces entered the area, including a company headquarters (D Company headquarters), at least two platoons (11 and 12 Platoons), and an additional company (C Company). It appears the operation involved most of a battalion, approximately 400 men.²⁴ The operation included both aerial bombardment and use of a field artillery battery, which increased the kinetic signature.

Australian operations reports allude to additional small-unit success in cross-border incursions. In small-scale border interdiction operations, platoon-size or smaller

²² Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 128.

²³ One operation, for example, ran from 10 to 30 June 1960. Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 155.

²⁴ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 127–129.

elements would cross into Thailand to push guerrillas south into Australian ambushes in Malaya.²⁵

F. BRITISH POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

The British government did not initially see the emerging insurgency in Malaya as pressing. The lack of British urgency was due in part to the stated objective of the CT guerrillas, which was to establish an independent Malayan state. When the hostilities began, the British had already begun transitioning Malaya away from colonial rule toward independence.²⁶ British newspapers made little mention of the terrorist attacks and murders by Chin Peng's forces in the opening stages of the war.²⁷ It was not until 6 October 1951, when the CTs ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner to Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, that the British government was galvanized to defeat the MCP.²⁸

While Gurney's death helped motivate the British political machine, his earlier directives shaped the conduct of the Emergency. Gurney had established two principles: 1) on no account would the armed forces have control over the conduct of the war, as this was a war of political ideologies, and 2) the 600,000 Chinese squatters would be resettled and given land rights, which was unprecedented in British colonial rule. The latter policy reduced public motivation to support the communists.²⁹ Under these two directives, the British received extensive support from the Malayan elites to enact extensive population control measures and to carry out offensive military operations. National will among the Malays was generally high, and the British continued to cede governing powers to the Malay elites over the course of the conflict.³⁰

²⁵ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 155.

²⁶ Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, 39.

²⁷ Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, 42.

²⁸ Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, 158.

²⁹ Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, 74, and 77–78.

³⁰ Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency*, 41.

The successful execution of the Briggs Plan, and the subsequent pacification of Malaya, helped gain and maintain popular support. From a peak of 8,000 CTs in 1951, the MRLA was down to approximately 3,000 fighters in 1955.³¹ The Emergency ended on 31 July 1960. The fight within the borders of Malaya was hailed as a successful counterinsurgency. However, a breakdown in the talks between the new Malay government and Chin Peng in December 1955 foreshadowed an eventual resurgence of the communist rebellion.³² Fortunately for the British, the border region was not a strong base of power for the CTs. Stringent bureaucratic arrangements had initially required the British to divulge extensive operational details for permission to conduct cross-border raids in Thailand. This requirement was in effect for the first year of the conflict, until the Malayan-Thai border agreement was signed in September 1949.³³ The agreement allowed for “hot pursuit” of communists up to eight kilometers across the border and with the assistance of a detachment of twelve Thai police officers. The terms were later expanded to ten and then 25 kilometers, with an additional agreement that British Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft and Thai Air Force aircraft could fly across the border without additional protocols or conditions.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an additional political mechanism that aided in the conduct of cross-border operations. The purpose of the organization was to prevent communism from spreading in Southeast Asia.³⁴ Only two Southeast Asian countries were members: Thailand and the Philippines, both close allies of the United States. The other members were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While the tenants of SEATO were not directly beneficial to the security of Malaya, it did facilitate cooperation between Thailand and British Commonwealth forces. There was some additional negotiating

³¹ Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 21.

³² Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency,” 21.

³³ Hack, “The Long March to Peace,” 191.

³⁴ U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1953–1960: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954.”

between the British and Thai governments in the conduct of cross-border military operations during the Malayan Emergency.³⁵

G. TIMING OF CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO THAILAND

The cross-border raids into Thailand occurred during the last two-thirds of the conflict, with arguably no direct impact on the conclusion of hostilities. Combined cross-border operations with British and Thai forces began under General Templer in 1952, with cooperative attacks on CT logistical bases in the border region.³⁶ However, border operations continued after the Emergency was declared ended. The 1 RAR continued border operations for a year after the formal conclusion of hostilities. No correlation between the timing of cross-border operations and the outcome of the insurgency is evident, excluding the link in 1952 between British attacks on logistical bases along the border and Chin Peng's move to Thailand.

H. THE TERMINATION OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS INTO THAILAND

Cross-border operations did not come to an abrupt halt; rather, they faded slowly. The formal cessation of hostilities in July 1960 established a relative calm in Malaya, soon to be called Malaysia. Chin Peng stayed near the border in Thailand for six months after the Emergency ended, and remnants of his MCP continued to fight, albeit with greatly diminished capabilities and impact.³⁷ Cross-border operations by British and Australian forces continued in the region as a result of a subsequent conflict in West Malaysia and Borneo.³⁸ Chin Peng's movement became insignificant, overshadowed by events of the 1970s.

³⁵ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 74.

³⁶ Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, 189.

³⁷ Hack, "The Long March to Peace," 181.

³⁸ See Jeffrey Grey, "Confrontation," in *Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966*, 167–369. The conflict in Borneo and West Malaysia is classified as a state-on-state war.

I. SUMMARY

Operations deep inside Thailand were costly in terms of manpower and time, and often lacked tangible results. But when a camp was discovered and successfully attacked, the gains were considerable. Almost every kill eliminated a hard-core member of the MRLA.³⁹ The cross-border raids had few political costs, because the British leveraged extensive external mechanisms to gain the support of neighboring Thailand. The British also mitigated the political costs of cross-border operations by implementing an effective national counterinsurgency plan that produced positive results. This helped justify the attack on guerrilla sanctuaries outside of pacified areas. The use of platoon-sized forces produced security gains and reduced the risk of offending Thailand. The British effectively used small-unit, cross-border raids into Thailand to complement their robust internal counterinsurgency effort. However, internal counterinsurgency methods were successful, and intelligence collection along the border region had generally satisfactory results. The risk of increasing the frequency of cross-border raids may have increased the political costs, without having a corresponding return in security gains, with respect to the overall outcome.

³⁹ Dennis, "The Malayan Emergency," 20.

III. NICARAGUA (1981–1990)

The Nicaraguan civil war between the Sandinistas and the Contras demonstrates the influence of external actors on the outcome of an insurgency. The Soviet Union and Cuba almost defeated the American-backed Contras until the United States became more steadfast in supporting the Contras. This chapter demonstrates how external actors, economic desires, and global conflict can affect cross-border raids.⁴⁰

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) seized control of Nicaragua following the 19 July 1979 ouster of the Somoza regime. Counterrevolutionaries emerged almost immediately with the formation of the 15th of September Legion, which joined with the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN) to form the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the primary Contra organization.⁴¹ The FDN eventually included the Miskito, an indigenous group from the Nicaraguan Atlantic coast that found itself in contention with the Sandinista government over land reform.⁴² In the south, a second major insurgency force, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), operated primarily out of Costa Rica.⁴³ The Sandinistas received direct aid from the Soviet Union and equipment and military advisors from Cuba, the Soviet surrogate. The United States was the primary supplier of aid to the Contras, who kept up insurgent military action against the Sandinistas until they were voted out of power. During three phases of the insurgency, where momentum shifted back and forth, both sides were influenced by external actors.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Focusing on the period of 1981–1990, English language texts largely take the side of the Contras and limit the information available from a Soviet/Sandinista perspective, despite U.S. support for the Sandinistas at the time of the ouster of the Somoza regime.

⁴¹ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2010), 67.

⁴² Paul, *Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, 67.

⁴³ Paul, *Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, 68.

⁴⁴ Paul, *Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, 67 – 70. The three phases are: Phase I: “Sandinistas Must Go” (February 1981 – May 1985) which resulted in a mixed outcome that favored the insurgents (Contras), Phase II: “Ortega and Strategic Defeat” (June 1985 – November 1986) which resulted in an outcome that favored the COIN force (Sandinistas), and Phase III: “America’s Invisible Hand” (December 1986 – April 1990) which culminated in a COIN force loss.

The allegiances of Nicaragua's neighbors influenced the political and military dynamics. To the south, Costa Rica's capitalist government was oriented towards the United States.⁴⁵ To the north, Honduras was also under the thumb of the United States, which delivered modern combat aircraft to the Honduran government and later positioned U.S. ground forces there.⁴⁶ Thus, the Sandinistas, and consequently the Soviets and Cubans, were crammed between two countries that served as sanctuaries for insurgents supported by the United States government.

B. THE DYNAMICS OF SANDINISTA CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY GAINS

The Sandinista military conducted at least three raids per year on Contra encampments in Honduras.⁴⁷ One Honduran source put the number of Nicaraguan cross-border raids at 300 by early April 1986.⁴⁸ The Sandinista objectives were to threaten Contra base camps, divert Contra forces to the defense of the camps, disrupt Contra logistics and infiltration routes, psychologically threaten the Contra leadership, and identify Honduras as a sanctuary for the Contras.⁴⁹

Raids undertaken later in the conflict were more widely reported by English-language news media as the United States strove to justify increased aid to its Contra surrogates. Of the identifiable cases of cross-border raids, the May 1987 raid received little publicity and thus cannot be investigated thoroughly.⁵⁰ Three cases are presented in this chapter. The first is an attack by two Nicaraguan Army battalions, a force of 1,500

⁴⁵ Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959–1987* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 11.

⁴⁶ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 200.

⁴⁷ James M. McCarl Jr., "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics" (Master's thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990), 120.

⁴⁸ James LeMoyne, "Honduran Official Says U.S. Exaggerated Sandinista Raid," *The Day*, 03 April 1986, accessed 12 February 2013, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1915&dat=19860403&id=t9IGAAAAIBAJ&sjid=WfgMAAAAI BAJ&pg=1322,459411>.

⁴⁹ McCarl, "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics," 120–121.

⁵⁰ Bernard E. Trainor, "Anti-Contra Drive: Ill-Fated Shift in Rebel Tactics," *The New York Times*, 21 March 1988, accessed 09 February 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/21/world/anti-contra-drive-ill-fated-shift-in-rebel-tactics.html>.

men, on a Contra camp in Honduras on 26 March 1986.⁵¹ The camp was reportedly twenty miles north of the border, near Nuevo Las Vegas.⁵² The second case began on 6 March 1988, with a major Sandinista Army offensive that culminated with Sandinista soldiers crossing into Honduras to attack Contra base camps on 23 March.⁵³ In the third case, on 13 April 1988, an unknown number of Nicaraguan soldiers destroyed the village of Suji in eastern Honduras, killing two and wounding 17.⁵⁴

The Sandinista military, under the influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union, relied on large formations to conduct cross-border operations. While the presence of Soviet or Cuban advisors on cross-border raids is not confirmed, the nature of the advisory program and relationship between Havana and Moscow suggest that Cuba's role was to implement Soviet doctrine.⁵⁵ The main army organizations engaged in tactical operations against the Contras were the Batallón de Lucha Cazador (BLCs) and Batallón de Lucha Irregular (BLIs).⁵⁶ The BLCs focused on specific geographical areas, while the BLIs maintained national counterinsurgency responsibility, operating throughout the center of Nicaragua between the Honduran and Costa Rican borders. The emphasis on battalion-sized operations came from Soviet counterinsurgency tactics in Afghanistan designed to surround and destroy guerrilla forces deep within insurgent strongholds.⁵⁷

⁵¹ "White House Says Action Responds to Troop Buildup," *The Miami News Express Edition*, 26 March 1986, accessed 08 February 2013, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=71XFh8zZwT8C&dat=19860326&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>

⁵² Ellen Hampton and Julia Malone, "Sandinista Raid Helps Contra Aid Chance In Senate," *The Miami News*, 26 March 1986, 4a, accessed 08 February 2013, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19860326&id=FXNYAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Qj0NAAAAIBAJ&pg=1846,7407178>

⁵³ Marjorie Miller, "Sandinistas Raid Honduras Again, Contras Say," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 March 1988, accessed 08 February 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-03-24/news/mn-361_1_sandinista-troops, and Gordon L. Bowen, "Foundations of U.S. Policies: The Contras Campaign Against Sandinista Nicaragua," accessed 08 February 2013, <http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/contras.htm>.

⁵⁴ "Honduras Says Sandinistas Destroyed A Village, Killing 2," *The New York Times*, 25 April 1988, accessed 08 February 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/25/world/honduras-says-sandinistas-destroyed-a-village-killing-2.html>

⁵⁵ McCarl, "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics," 106. According to Francis McNeill, former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, there were believed to be 800 to 1,200 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua, a large difference in the reported 3,000 Cuban advisors that were claimed by the U.S. State Department; McCarl, 48.

⁵⁶ McCarl, "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics," 96.

⁵⁷ McCarl, "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics," 104.

The Sandinistas' large counterinsurgent cross-border operations made self-defense arguments implausible; it was difficult to mitigate second and third order post-raid effects. The BLI was designed to attack Contra forces of 200 men or more, and the BLC would use an entire battalion in attacks on Contra forces larger than forty men.⁵⁸ Such large cross-border operations have extensive planning and logistical requirements. For example, in the March 1988 offensive, large numbers of Nicaraguan troops and supply convoys established a command post 30 miles from the Honduran/Nicaraguan border in the mining town of Bonanza.⁵⁹ This single operation involved upwards of 4,500 soldiers, while the incursion on 26 March involved only 1,500. With six battalions involved in cross-border attacks, it was difficult for the Sandinista government to downplay its violation of a sovereign border.

The Nicaraguan Forces had good intelligence for their cross-border attacks. The March 1988 offensive was successful because the Contra insurgents, after moving from Yamales to the San Adres de Bocay area at the request of the Honduran government, stagnated for over a year.⁶⁰ Although the terrain was challenging and the Contra base camps were dispersed, the Nicaraguan forces conducted effective attacks against several logistical bases and medical facilities, and took control of a dirt airstrip.⁶¹ However, the Sandinistas were not able to kill or capture the Contras head, Enrique Bermudez, who was in the border region with his staff.⁶²

The Nicaraguan Army effectively disrupted Contra activities in Honduras with its large-scale cross-border raids. The May 1987 raid into the Bocay River valley destroyed weapons, ammunition and food, and denied the Contras a safe haven. This raid was critical because supplies had become more valuable with the waning of U.S. aid.

⁵⁸ McCarl, "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics," 106 and 114.

⁵⁹ Bernard E. Trainor, "Anti-Contra Drive: Ill-Fated Shift in Rebel Tactics," *The New York Times*, 21 March 1988, accessed 09 February 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/21/world/anti-contra-drive-ill-fated-shift-in-rebel-tactics.html>.

⁶⁰ Bernard E. Trainor, "Anti-Contra Drive: Ill-Fated Shift in Rebel Tactics," *The New York Times*, 21 March 1988, accessed 09 February 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/21/world/anti-contra-drive-ill-fated-shift-in-rebel-tactics.html>

⁶¹ McCarl, "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics," 121.

⁶² James M. McCarl Jr., "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics" (Master's thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990), 74.

Honduran reactions to the cross-border raids were mixed. Prior to the large Sandinista offensive in March 1988, Honduras did not perceive the raids as a direct threat to their government. After the U.S. stepped up its aid, it appears that the Hondurans were bought by U.S. money and military support. American resolve was tested when the Hondurans pressed for military action against Nicaragua utilizing U.S. war material.⁶³

The size of the operational area where Nicaragua conducted cross-border raids is largely irrelevant in light of the political environment. By design, the BLIs could move from one area to the next without any impact on the scope of the war. However, increased use of BLIs did require increased use of BLCs in offensive operations. In fact, the expansion of the Nicaraguan military was a response to the perceived military threat from the United States, not because of stepped-up operations in the border regions.⁶⁴ The March 1988 cross-border raids triggered a U.S. response that included support from the U.S. Senate in the form of increased aid and the deployment of 3,200 U.S. soldiers—an indication of the high political cost of the cross-border engagements.⁶⁵

C. THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND POLITICAL COSTS

The Nicaraguan communist party was formed in 1939.⁶⁶ From 1941 to 1947, Soviet Russia instructed Latin American regional communist movements to support Allied war efforts, but this ended with the conclusion of World War II and the onset of the Cold War.⁶⁷ At the time, Soviet objectives in Latin America were “to strengthen Soviet influence wherever possible, to defend ‘Socialist’ Cuba, and to weaken the still

⁶³ LeMoyne, “Honduran Official Says U.S. Exaggerated Sandinista Raid.”

⁶⁴ McCarl, “Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics,” 53.

⁶⁵ Ellen Hampton and Julia Malone, “Sandinista Raid Helps Contra Aid Chance in Senate,” *The Miami News*, 26 March 1986, 4a, accessed 08 February 2013, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19860326&id=FXNYAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Qj0NAAAAIBAJ&pg=1846,7407178>

Marjorie Miller, “Sandinistas Raid Honduras Again, Contreras Say,” *Los Angeles Times*, 24 March 1988, accessed 08 February 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-03-24/news/mn-361_1_sandinista-troops.

⁶⁶ James D. Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1974), 4.

⁶⁷ Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America*, 5.

predominant position of the United States.”⁶⁸ Until the mid-1980s, the Soviets viewed the region as lacking “objective” and “subjective” conditions for a Communist victory; they anticipated that more progressive Socialist movements were needed to prepare the political and economic base for Socialist reconstruction.⁶⁹

Entrenched U.S. socio-political and economic dominance in Latin America constrained Soviet efforts to project power and consolidate a strong economic presence.⁷⁰ After Gorbachev’s ascension to Communist Party leadership in 1985, the Soviets focused on establishing a visible economic presence in Latin America.⁷¹ They began to look more closely at creating ties within Latin America to further the Soviet socialist movement.

The Soviets were guardedly reserved in committing their political will, sharing information, and sending forces to support the Nicaraguan campaign against the Contras. The communist revolutionary movement had suffered three defeats in Latin America—in El Salvador in 1932, Costa Rica in 1948, and Guatemala in 1954. Soviet analysts, anticipating U.S. intervention after the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution, had doubts about the insurgency’s prospects.⁷² In Nicaragua, as in El Salvador, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) “was reluctant to involve itself in the affairs of a Third World country in which the USSR had no security concerns and which was rapidly becoming the focus of U.S. definitions of its own national interest.”⁷³ In 1980 and 1981, with the Carter administration’s indecisive response to events in Nicaragua and the Sandinista’s efficient consolidation of power, Soviet optimism increased.⁷⁴ Putting aside their reservations, the Soviets made an economic pact to supply arms to the Sandinista government. The Nicaraguans agreed to the pact with the Soviets only because they had exhausted virtually every other means of obtaining weapons.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America*, 5.

⁶⁹ Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America*, 6.

⁷⁰ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 14.

⁷¹ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 184.

⁷² Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 192.

⁷³ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 190.

⁷⁴ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 192.

⁷⁵ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 201.

The cross-border raids by Sandinista forces resulted in increased U.S. monetary aid to the Contras and the positioning of U.S. forces in Honduras. With the U.S. exerting increased pressure in the region, the Soviets, by way of their proxy Cuba, had little interest in continuing to support the Sandinista government. The Soviets' initial belief that they stood to gain only limited strategic and political gains from the Sandinistas was correct.⁷⁶ Economically, the Soviets saw little compatibility between the Soviet and Nicaraguan economies.⁷⁷ Most importantly, the USSR saw little advantage in defending Nicaragua compared with the value of their relationship with Cuba, which is strategically located inside U.S. shipping lanes.⁷⁸

D. THE OVERALL TIMING OF NICARAGUAN CROSS-BORDER OFFENSIVES

The timing of Nicaraguan cross-border raids was more relevant to political events than to force attrition. The March 1988 incursion into Honduras provoked a clear U.S. response and put the Managua-based politicians in check. The timing of the raids hastened the end of the conflict because cross-border raids triggered extensive political pressure that constrained the Sandinistas' fighting ability. The Soviet Union, instead of countering U.S. presence, used the controversy as an opportunity to exit Nicaragua, separate itself from the crumbling economic situation in Latin America, and focus on its war in Afghanistan.⁷⁹

E. THE TERMINATION OF NICARAGUAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

The Nicaraguan military halted cross-border raids because their limited security gains did not justify the high political cost. Of their five objectives, the Sandinistas accomplished three. They attacked and threatened Contra base camps, disrupted Contra logistics and infiltration routes, and identified Honduras as a Contra sanctuary.

⁷⁶ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 198.

⁷⁷ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 209.

⁷⁸ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 198.

⁷⁹ Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, 213 and 216.

The movement of the Contra base camp complex from Yamales to Bocay is evidence of how the Nicaraguan attacks threatened Contra logistics bases. But the disruption to Contra logistics often came at a hefty price. Sandinista military elements faced fierce resistance and heavy casualties. Their raids provoked Honduran military retaliation against targets inside Nicaragua. The March 1986 raid against El Paraiso by 1,500 to 2,000 Sandinista soldiers resulted in 300 and 400 casualties from a counterattack by Contras returning to Honduras from an operation in Nicaragua.⁸⁰ The December 1986 Sandinista raid on the Contras at the Las Vegas salient involved approximately 1,000 soldiers and provoked Honduran Air Force attacks on military targets inside Nicaragua.⁸¹

The identification of Honduras as a Contra refuge undermined Nicaraguan efforts. When the Nicaraguans developed the area for military operations, the United States stepped up its anti-Sandinista rhetoric. Ultimately, the Sandinistas' security gains were overshadowed by the political costs: the external pressure that United States exerted through Honduras, the threat of American military involvement, and the wavering commitment of the Soviets.

F. SUMMARY

The Soviet and Cuban-backed Sandinista government's poor application of cross-border raids into Honduras adversely affected their counterinsurgency against the U.S.-supported Contras. Large troop movements, long logistical lines, and limited success of cross-border raids generated few security gains at significant political cost. The scale of Sandinista cross-border raids, rather than their frequency, is the flaw in the campaign plan. Soviet ambivalence and U.S. determination meant the Nicaraguan government could not reduce the political cost of their raids, and the Sandinistas eventually ended all cross-border operations. Less dramatic and intensive use of Sandinista military force was inconsistent with Soviet doctrine, but a more temperate approach would have entailed fewer political costs.

⁸⁰ H. T. Hayden, "Resistance in Nicaragua," *Marine Corps Gazette* 72 (1988): 66.

⁸¹ Hayden, "Resistance in Nicaragua," 66–67.

IV. ALGERIAN INDEPENDENCE (1954–1962)

The Algerian War of Independence is the null case in this study. This chapter examines two cross-border military raids. Neither involved ground troops and thus, both operations fall outside the focus of this thesis. However, because ground assault options were considered but deemed too costly, the raids discussed in this chapter provide important lessons for the security gain/political cost paradigm.⁸²

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Algerian War of Independence began in November 1954 when members of the newly formed Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) conducted attacks across Algeria against government buildings, police stations, and farms.⁸³ The FLN was the primary political wing of the insurgents. Its military wing, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), conducted kinetic operations against French interests. The ALN seized arms and ammunition from the French until logistical support was firmly established in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco, which took place after the French ended their occupation of the two countries 1956.⁸⁴ By 1958 the insurgents had largely lost the military struggle, and with the French Challe offensive of 1959, the ALN was almost finished as a significant military force.⁸⁵ However, following the Evian Agreements in March 1962, the rebels achieved the ultimate victory, Algerian independence, on 3 July 1962. The rebels secured diplomatic and political advantage by sowing doubt in the minds of the war-weary French people and the fragmented French government.⁸⁶

The neighboring countries of Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya provided important external support and sanctuary to the FLN forces. By the end of the war,

⁸² Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 113.

⁸³ Timothy M. Bairstow, “Border Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: A Look at Algeria, Rhodesia, and Iraq” (Master’s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006), 22.

⁸⁴ Charles R. Shrader, *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria 1954–1962* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 164.

⁸⁵ Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 3.

⁸⁶ Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 3.

Tunisia was home to 31 different FLN bases and training centers, including, at one point, a garrison of about thirty thousand ALN fighters. Morocco sheltered 40 smaller FLN bases.⁸⁷ Small camps and logistical hubs were present in Egypt and Libya, but most of these camps were rendered insignificant by French naval interdiction operations that forced logistics through Tunisia and Morocco.⁸⁸ The French also denied the Sahara Desert as a viable infiltration route through the use of ground-based radar systems.⁸⁹

B. FRENCH ATTEMPTS AT ISOLATION

After the war in Indochina and the nationalist uprisings in Tunisia and Morocco, the French knew that isolating rebels from the population was the only way to win the war in Algeria.⁹⁰ Because military material support to the ALN could only come from abroad, the French decided to seal the Algerian borders.⁹¹ The Morice Line was a formidable barrier of wire, mines and electronics. Completed in 1957, it ran from the Mediterranean Sea to the Sahara Desert along the Tunisian border.⁹² The Tunisian border fence ran 450 kilometers, while a second fence along the Moroccan border totaled 750 kilometers in length.⁹³ The fence network managed to interdict 95 percent of all infiltrations by ALN forces into Algeria.⁹⁴ Together the Morice Line and the Challe plan, which stationed garrisons of static security forces in Algerian towns, would have broken

⁸⁷ Bairstow, "Border Interdiction," 23.

⁸⁸ Bairstow, "Border Interdiction," 23.

⁸⁹ Bairstow, "Border Interdiction," 30.

⁹⁰ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria 1956–1958* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 64.

⁹¹ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 61.

⁹² Alistair Horne, *The Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 263–264.

⁹³ David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 100.

⁹⁴ Francois-Marie Gougeon, "The Challe Plan: Vain yet Indispensable Victory," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 16, no. 3 (2005): 297. A slightly lower percentage is cited by David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft in *Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum of Operations*. Johnson, et al. estimate interdicted external support at 90 percent, including the capture of 4,600 weapons and the death of 6,000 FLN soldiers; see p. 100.

the Algerian insurgency if not for the political upheaval created by the FLN in Algeria and France.⁹⁵

C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION, DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE IN THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN PARADIGM

In the middle of 1958, French military capability peaked at around 400,000 men, later stabilizing to approximately 380,000.⁹⁶ With as many as 80,000 soldiers deployed along the Morice Line, the monetary and material cost of defending 1200 kilometers proved unsustainable.⁹⁷ The economic crisis in France limited funds for the war effort, and the Morice Line required constant reinforcement and repair.⁹⁸ After seven months, the Morice Line was abandoned. However, the effort had damaged the FLN, rendering them tactically ineffective. French information management was largely successful, vindicating the efforts of the French security forces.⁹⁹

However, two French cross-border operations had catastrophic impact on the French war effort. The first was the October 1956 French diversion of the Morocco-bound aircraft bearing FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella and five FLN operatives. The diversion resulted in their capture. Because Ben Bella's popularity was waning within the FLN ranks, the political ramifications of his capture were greater than the operational-level impact.¹⁰⁰ The second operation was the French bombing of the Tunisian city of Sakiet on 8 February 1958.¹⁰¹ The FLN exploited public opinion against the collateral damage to civilian infrastructure, effectively thwarting France's chance for a peaceful compromise with the FLN and Tunisian leadership.¹⁰²

For the purpose of this thesis, these cases highlight the value of strong intelligence (albeit with bad indiscriminate execution in the case of Sakiet), short duration, narrow

⁹⁵ Bairstow, "Border Interdiction," 35–36.

⁹⁶ Gougeon, "The Challe Plan," 297.

⁹⁷ Johnson, *Conventional Coercion*, 100–101.

⁹⁸ Horne, *The Savage War of Peace*, 268. Also see Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 92.

⁹⁹ Horne, *The Savage War of Peace*, 268.

¹⁰⁰ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 251.

¹⁰¹ Newsom, *The Imperial Mantle*, 82–83.

¹⁰² Horne, *The Savage War Of Peace*, 249–250.

operational areas, and carefully tailored force sizes. In both cases, the French paid high political costs, suffering substantial negative international and domestic consequences.¹⁰³ The rebels, recognizing the impact of information operations, exploited French atrocities and created great psychological impacts in France and elsewhere by terrorist acts in Algiers and other major cities.¹⁰⁴

D. FRENCH POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

Both the metropolitan French and the ethnic French *pieds noirs* saw Algeria, unlike Tunisia and Morocco, as sovereign French territory.¹⁰⁵ By granting independence to Tunisia and Morocco, thus lessening their burden in North Africa, the French concentrated on keeping Algeria.¹⁰⁶ The formal independence agreements between France and the states of Tunisia and Morocco specified the protection of French persons and property and continued French economic, military and cultural influence. Within month, the agreements rang hollow, as both nations lent support to the FLN.¹⁰⁷

The French capture of Ben Bella resulted in further attacks against French settlers and earned the scorn of Muhammed V of Morocco, who had hosted the FLN leaders.¹⁰⁸ Rather than obstruct the political progress toward independence in Morocco and Tunisia, or attack into them, the French chose to isolate Algeria with a sophisticated fence. French military leaders began to resent the government when their tactical urgency was impeded by economic uncertainty and political indecision in France.¹⁰⁹ The infighting and plotting

¹⁰³ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 231. Evans points out that the Sakiet raid, sanctioned by the Gaillard government in France, was due to frustration within the French army, which saw Tunisian President Bourguiba as an ally of the FLN.

¹⁰⁴ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 62.

¹⁰⁵ Gougeon, "The Challe Plan," 295–296. As early as 1848, Algeria was declared a true part of France with representative government in Paris and Algeria.

¹⁰⁶ David D. Newsom, *The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 82.

¹⁰⁷ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 7–8.

¹⁰⁸ Newsom, *The Imperial Mantle*, 83.

¹⁰⁹ Horne, *The Savage War Of Peace*, 267–269.

within the French government and military came to a head with the Sakiet raid.¹¹⁰ The Sakiet raid proved so unpopular that it caused the ouster of the Gaillard government.¹¹¹

E. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION

While the Ben Bella incident was politically costly, the Sakiet raid brought international pressure to the forefront. The civilian casualties allowed the Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, to order the immediate evacuation of French forces. The raid also justified charges of French “aggression” at the United Nations’ Security Council.¹¹² Frances’ failure to properly disseminate information to the world audience allowed the FLN to change the narrative of the attack. The French had attacked after several filing several formal protests with the Tunisian government; the attack was consistent with the military’s 1957 standing orders.¹¹³ French mismanagement of information is also exemplified by their slowness in reporting that 90 percent of the village was still intact while 80 percent of guerrilla targets were destroyed and 100 rebels killed.¹¹⁴ Instead French intelligence called the outcome of the raid “incalculable.”¹¹⁵

F. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE

In Sakiet, force size was an issue; the duration of the operation was not. The French bombardment of Sakiet involved 25 planes—eleven B26 bombers, six Corsair fighter-bombers, and eight Mistral fighters.¹¹⁶ The use of these weapons was justifiable, but the images publicized by the FLN invited doubt and international condemnation, including pressure from the United States, which saw the use of American military

¹¹⁰ Evans, *Algeria*, 231–232.

¹¹¹ Evans, *Algeria*, 232.

¹¹² Horne, *The Savage War Of Peace*, 250.

¹¹³ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 104.

¹¹⁴ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 110.

¹¹⁵ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 111.

¹¹⁶ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 110.

equipment in such an attack as egregious.¹¹⁷ It was argued that one plane could have destroyed the antiaircraft installation. Gaillard was immediately forced to cover for the army, even though the operation was conducted within the scope of the government's orders.¹¹⁸ Ironically, an air attack was chosen over a ground raid for fear a ground assault would look like an invasion of Tunisia and produce too many casualties.¹¹⁹

G. NATIONAL WILL

Sakiet became a symbol counter to its original intent. It fatally harmed the French cause. Chaos in Paris after the attack revealed the dysfunctions of the French government.¹²⁰ France was already strained by poor economics, a string of costly and bloody conflicts, and political infighting. There was so much turmoil in France that at one point there was a threat to drop paratroopers on Paris to install Charles de Gaulle's Republican government.¹²¹ The Sakiet raid was the downfall of the Gaillard government. De Gaulle took the helm of the French government on 1 June 1958 by a vote of 329 to 224.¹²² Amid widespread disenchantment with the government, de Gaulle was seen as the one person who could save France from civil war, unite the population, and deliver a tangible solution to the problem of Algeria.¹²³

H. THE TIMING OF FRENCH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

The timing of the Sakiet raid had extensive repercussions politically but negligible effects operationally. The Sakiet raid had limited tactical benefit and catastrophic political implications for the French because of the political discourse

¹¹⁷ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 111–116. The Corsairs had disabled the antiaircraft emplacements while the B-26s destroyed the mine which was being used by the FLN/ALN as a rebel encampment. The U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, seized on the idea of French “military excess” and opened a door for the United States to become more actively involved in North African security.

¹¹⁸ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 111–113.

¹¹⁹ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 113.

¹²⁰ Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War*, 116.

¹²¹ Evans, *Algeria*, 235. French General Raoul Salan called off the airborne drop in Paris to install Charles de Gaulle in power, Operation Resurrection, on 19 May 1958.

¹²² Evans, *Algeria*, 235

¹²³ Evans, *Algeria*, 236.

underway in France and the placidity with which the French handled the young Tunisian and Moroccan governments. In effect, the timing of the raid was more important in the political realm than in the context of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This shows that cross-border raids can have dramatic political repercussions, and that such effects are not necessarily insurmountable. De Gaulle, through General Maurice Challe, gained military victory by 1960. The French were ultimately defeated by the Algerian vote for independence in 1962.¹²⁴

I. SUMMARY

The French withdrawal from Algeria cannot be pinned on a single pivotal event, the bombing of Sakiet, although Sakiet exemplifies the FLN's proficiency in exploiting French atrocities and the upheaval within the French government during the conflict. The Sakiet raid relied on aircraft because the use of ground forces was deemed too costly. The French use of the Morice Line had mixed results. It was very effective at cutting off external support to the FLN, but it was costly to maintain and demoralizing to the soldiers stationed on the fortifications.¹²⁵ Political infighting did little to help legitimize France's intentions to the world audience. Had the French government been less divided, more attuned to its military forces, and more committed to military directives and information management, external sanctuaries within Tunisia and Morocco might have been attacked with fewer political consequences.

¹²⁴ Gougeon, "The Challe Plan," 293.

¹²⁵ Horne, *The Savage War Of Peace*, 266–267.




Figure 5. Map of Algeria Showing Border Fortifications¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Bairstow, "Border Interdiction in Counterinsurgency," 29.

V. NAMIBIA (1960–1989)

The insurgency in Namibia (formerly known as South-West Africa) shows how cross-border operations can spiral out of control. Because it failed to respect human rights standards, South Africa, the colonial ruler of South-West Africa, came under intense scrutiny by human rights advocates for its raids outside of Namibia. In addition, Soviet and Cuban support to neighboring countries, specifically Angola, greatly increased the political costs associated with large-scale cross-border operations. This case demonstrates when a large cross-border clash is enmeshed with communist expansionism and human rights violations. The case also involves an ineffective and questionable Namibian counterinsurgency model designed to maintain white dominance in the government and the region.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

South Africa asserted colonial rule over Namibia following Germany's defeat in World War I. In 1960, the future Namibian people formed the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to counter racially discriminatory South African policies. This was followed by the formation of SWAPO's armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in 1966.¹²⁷ For almost 30 years, South Africa controlled security inside Namibia as well as cross-border operations in nine regional states. This chapter discusses cross-border incursions directly related to the insurrection in Namibia.¹²⁸

In July 1988, the Angolan, Cuban and South African governments announced an agreement to establish peace in southwestern Africa.¹²⁹ The Namibia-Angola Peace

¹²⁷ Guy Lamb, "Putting Belligerents In Context: The Cases of Namibia and Angola," in *Civilians in War*, ed. Simon Chesterman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2001), 26.

¹²⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report* (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation, 1998), vol. 2, 42.

¹²⁹ John Barratt, *Angola/Namibia: Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement Brief Report No. 69* (Johannesburg: The South African Institute Of International Affairs, 1988), 1, accessed 20 February 2013, <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32475/1/Brief%20Report%20No.69.pdf?1>.

Accord was formally accepted on 23 November. It was dependent upon the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and South African forces from Namibia.¹³⁰

At the time, the political environment in the south of Africa was characterized by conflict and mixed allegiances. Namibia was governed by South Africa under a post-World War I mandate for ex-German territories.¹³¹ There were South African Police (SAP) operations in Rhodesia and surrogate-force campaigns in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.¹³² Angola was of central importance to the political environment. The South African Defense Force (SADF) was conducting cross-border operations against SWAPO elements and waging a covert war against the Cuban-backed Angolan government by supplying arms to guerrillas from the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA).¹³³ Angola, and all the military and political dealings therein, proved pivotal to the cessation of fighting in Namibia.

B. GOVERNMENT-BACKED CROSS BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY

P.W. Botha's election as South Africa's Prime Minister in 1978 ushered in an era of aggressive South African cross-border operations in southern Angola.¹³⁴ Botha's war strategy evolved over the next four years in response to growing SWAPO military capabilities, a buildup of Angolan heavy weapons in southern Angola, and the changing political environment in Namibia and in the United States.¹³⁵ The objectives of the Botha

¹³⁰ John D. Battersby, "Pretoria Agrees To Namibia-Angola Peace Accord," *The New York Times*, 23 November 1988, accessed 20 February 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/23/world/pretoria-agrees-to-namibia-angola-peace-accord.html>.

¹³¹ Robert S. Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: the Botha Strategy* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 3.

¹³² Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, vol. 2, 42.

¹³³ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 51.

¹³⁴ P. W. Botha followed John Vorster, who served as the South African Prime Minister from 1966 to 1978. Vorster tried to quell Namibian instability and United Nations qualms through the direct application of South African policy, namely apartheid. Ultimately, the Turnhalle Initiative was adopted in response to increased external political pressure against apartheid. The Turnhalle Initiative began with a constitutional conference in September 1975 that produced a mandate to construct a constitution and an interim government to transition Namibia to independence. By 1978, fearing a Marxist terrorist takeover of the territory and in the face of a SWAPO-led campaign of kidnappings and assassinations, the plan fell apart and the conflict changed directions. See Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 3–14.

¹³⁵ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 45–46.

strategy were to destroy SWAPO as a credible military force, and to demonstrate South Africa's resolve in the face of armed insurgency and its determination avoid political concessions forced by military weakness.¹³⁶ This flexible strategy was later summarized by the South African Minister of Defense, General Magnus Malan, in an address to Parliament on 4 February 1986.

The security forces will hammer them, wherever they find them. What I am saying is the policy of the government. We will not sit here with hands folded waiting for them to cross the borders... we shall settle the hash of those terrorists, their fellow-travelers and those who help them.¹³⁷

Following Botha's proclamation, SADF began cross-border raids that gradually increased in frequency and scope. The first raid was in May 1978; it lasted one or two days and destroyed a SWAPO camp.¹³⁸ This was followed by joint SADF air and ground operations in Angola and Zambia. By 1982, South Africa's cross-border raids were paying off, although SWAPO remained a threat.¹³⁹ The South African raids meant SWAPO could not establish permanent bases in southern Angola. The raids complicated SWAPO's logistical and recruiting operations; SWAPO lost large quantities of arms and equipment and suffered several hundred casualties annually. Most importantly, the raids weakened SWAPO's negotiating position.¹⁴⁰

C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION

South African intelligence collection on suspected SWAPO sanctuaries must be categorized as good to excellent. While no direct link can be established between any particular SADF organization and any given cross-border raid, the fact that SADF controlled a large portion of southern Angola gave them a direct hand in intelligence

¹³⁶ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 46.

¹³⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, 42.

¹³⁸ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 48. Jaster chronicles a number of cross-border raids from the May 1978 cross-border raid onwards. Unless otherwise noted, references to these raids are found on pp. 48–65.

¹³⁹ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 56.

¹⁴⁰ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 56.

collection, including access to South African-backed UNITA fighters.¹⁴¹ The regular conduct of operations within southern Angola and high-level South African support indicate the magnitude of cross-border intelligence collection efforts. The United States' covert support of South Africa's Operation Savannah in 1975, three years before unilateral SADF operations began in earnest, also relied on the systematic development of intelligence to support operations.¹⁴²

D. DURATION

As the success of SADF cross-border raids became routine, the duration of the operations increased. The very short May 1978 raid eventually led to the near-complete occupation of southern Angola following Botha's 1988 edict that South African troops would remain in Angola until the Cubans left.¹⁴³ The occupation was essentially a continuation of thirteen years of SADF operations originating from southern Angola.¹⁴⁴

E. OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE

SADF cross-border operations were so strong that almost no type of unit, size, or depth of target was off the table. In August 1981, SADF launched Operation Protea, the largest South African mechanized military operation since World War II.¹⁴⁵ At the height of Operation Protea, SADF occupied 50,000 square kilometers of Angola's Cunene province. The SADF attacks extended 175 miles north of the Namibia-Angola border

¹⁴¹ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 56.

¹⁴² Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, 45.

Kelly Bell, "Operation Savannah: Task Force Zulu and the Rommel of Angola," *Modern War Magazine* 4 (2013): 40–43. Bell outlines the CIA's support to FNLA fighters as part of the United States' struggle against the USSR. The American backing of FNLA fighters was seen as important for protecting South African mineral wealth and securing global petroleum shipping routes.

¹⁴³ "Angola And Namibia: Counter-Revolution in Retreat," *Phambili* 2 (1988): 26, accessed 20 February 2013, http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_displaydc&recordID=PaOct88.1816.6180.000.003.Oct1988.

¹⁴⁴ Bernard E. Trainor, "South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans' Role," *The New York Times*, 12 July 1988, accessed 22 February 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/12/world/south-africa-s-strategy-on-angola-falls-short-enhancing-cubans-role.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>. See also, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, 57.

¹⁴⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, 58.

without serious threat of retaliation.¹⁴⁶ In May 1978, SADF attacked a camp at Cassinga within fifteen kilometers of Cuban and Angolan forces with no detectable military response.¹⁴⁷ South Africa's military superiority gave it nearly unfettered access to large portions of Angola until June 1988, when the military dynamic shifted after a South African attack near the Namibian border was met by an Angolan counter-attack at the Caleque Dam.¹⁴⁸

F. SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

The South African government framed the need for military action in Namibia, and subsequently into Angola, as part of the West's resistance to the spread of Soviet communism.¹⁴⁹ However, the war was perceived as a domestic one with international features; it was in fact a confrontation between Black Africa (non-whites) and the South African apartheid policy of white dominance.¹⁵⁰ Had the South Africa government fully embraced the concepts of the internationally accepted Turnhalle Initiative and held elections in 1978, SWAPO's initiative for independence might well have been preempted.¹⁵¹ This would have been similar to the British government's actions during the Malayan Emergency. However, the militant stance of the Botha government destroyed the chances of an internationally acceptable agreement to insure black Africans equality and a meaningful role in the political system.

G. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION

South Africa's high political costs were a result of destructive aspects of SADF operations and their extensive use of cross-border raids under broad government

¹⁴⁶ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 58–89.

¹⁴⁷ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, 47.

¹⁴⁸ "Angola and Namibia: Counter-Revolution in Retreat," 28.

¹⁴⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, 43.

¹⁵⁰ J. H. P. Serfontein, *Namibia?* (London: Rex Collings, 1976), 65. This is reaffirmed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report* (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation, 1998), vol. 2, 44.

¹⁵¹ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 13–14.

directives. The May 1978 SADF attack against the camp of Cassinga as part of Operation Reindeer effectively disrupted SWAPO military operations but also had a devastating effect on South Africa's international relationships. Mistreatment and misidentification of civilians on the battlefield were cited as direct violations of the laws of war.¹⁵² South African anxiety about external reactions to the raid is revealed by the situation reports requested by the SADF leadership. A request at 1930 hours for reports on civilian casualties is followed at 2050 hours by an inquiry whether any Cubans had been captured.¹⁵³ The gross neglect of human rights by SADF reflects directly on the high-level South African officials who approved the operation despite knowing there would be civilians on the battlefield. Diplomatic efforts to justify the South African cause rang hollow to the international community.

H. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE

In Namibia, the duration and force size of SADF operations correlates with the political cost to South Africa. South African soldiers' freedom of movement in early cross-border attacks was essentially unchallenged by Angolan and Cuban forces. The Cuban position on South African cross-border operations was basically defensive. When SADF operations intensified in 1985, the Angolan government became increasingly concerned for its own survival and requested more military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁴ The Angolan military capacity and competence increased. When Angola also acquired Soviet MiG 23s, the SADF was forced to shift from a purely offensive strategy to a more defensive one.¹⁵⁵ The Soviet-bloc response led to active military engagements between SADF and Cuban forces in Angola. Military confrontations between the SADF and the Cubans culminated in the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola in 1988.

¹⁵² Lamb, "Putting Belligerents in Context," 27.

¹⁵³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *South Africa Report*, 51.

¹⁵⁴ "Angola and Namibia: Counter-Revolution in Retreat," 27.

¹⁵⁵ "Angola and Namibia: Counter-Revolution in Retreat," 27. Also see, Trainor, "South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans' Role."

I. NATIONAL WILL

The South African will to fight in Namibia weakened when SADF was pushed south of the Namibian border in 1988. The loss of military superiority helped force South Africa to the negotiating table. The South Africans had a strong desire to see Cuban withdrawal from Angola so they could reestablish military superiority over Angola.¹⁵⁶ At the same time, continued United Nations condemnation of South African operations in Namibia and Angola led to devastating international sanctions and increased South African war costs. The SADF activities in southern Angola were accompanied by South Africa's unsuccessful efforts to install a new government in Namibia. South African leaders hoped to maintain the white-led government and to dominate the external political actors active in the region.¹⁵⁷ Meanwhile, increasing numbers of South African English and Afrikaan youth joined anti-war protests and refused to enter conscripted service. The combined reactions of international, Namibian, and domestic elements put the South African leadership in a political stranglehold.¹⁵⁸

J. THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS IN NAMIBIA

The timing of the South African cross-border raids was insignificant compared to their duration. The cross-border campaign turned into a thirteen-year occupation of southern Angola. Although the cross-border raids resulted in significant security gains, the benefits were overshadowed by the intensity of SADF conduct against SWAPO and Angolan military sites and the SADF human rights atrocities. The Cuban/Angolan response to continued violations of sovereignty (long duration) were another important factor in ending the conflict. The prolonged cross-border operations and the disposition of Cuban and South African forces resulted in the Namibia-Angola Peace Accord.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ "Angola And Namibia: Counter-Revolution in Retreat," 30.

¹⁵⁷ Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia*, 65–71.

¹⁵⁸ "Angola and Namibia: Counter-Revolution in Retreat," 29.

¹⁵⁹ Battersby, "Pretoria Agrees to Namibia-Angola Peace Accord."

K. SUMMARY

The South African government's willingness to absorb the political costs of the cross-border operations in 1978 resulted in a rigid stance that led to the prolonged occupation of southern Angola and the intimidation of Cuban and Angolan leaders. The SADF military operations in southern Angola were so forceful and prolonged that they provoked international pressure to end the conflict. The South African government eventually combined its counter-insurgency campaign in Namibia with a counter-communist strategy in Angola. Even though the Cubans withdrew from Angola, the SADF had to abandon Namibia. Regardless of the military outcome, the white South African government was bound for failure due to international sanctions imposed because of its domestic apartheid policies.

VI. SOUTH VIETNAM (1960–1975)

The U.S. involvement in Vietnam was a limited conventional war. However, the United States also waged a covert war in Laos and Cambodia. In Cambodia, this briefly became an overt battle involving thousands of U.S. soldiers. This case study illustrates both overt and covert strategies against external enemy sanctuaries. The covert campaign in Laos and Cambodia was so broad that capturing all but the major points is beyond the scope of this chapter. The same can be said for the overt Cambodian campaign, but the overt operation there is more easily researched. These two campaigns exemplify different military and political methodologies applied to the same war and the same political context.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

American involvement in Vietnam begins near the end of World War II. The French began battling an insurgency in their colony of Indochina in 1946, but were defeated by the communists at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.¹⁶⁰ The subsequent 1954 Geneva agreement was seen by the U.S. as conducive to communist exploitation in Southeast Asia.¹⁶¹ Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was formed in February 1962. In February 1965, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson committed armed forces to South Vietnam in order to defend it from North Vietnamese communist aggression.¹⁶² The war escalated through the April 1968 high-water mark of 549,500 American combat personnel in Vietnam.¹⁶³ American troops began drawing down the following year and completed withdrawal in January 1973. The war between the North and the South did not

¹⁶⁰ Thomas C. Thayer, *War without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), xxvii.

¹⁶¹ Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 5. Sharp notes that while the United States appeared to support the return of all French colonial possessions after World War II, the United States was “also deeply committed to the Atlantic Charter, which supported national self-determination for all countries.”

¹⁶² Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat*, 1.

¹⁶³ Thayer, *War Without Fronts*, xxvii.

end until April 1975, when the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) defeated the Republic of Vietnam forces.¹⁶⁴

In January 1950, the French government established Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as autonomous "associated states" within the French Union.¹⁶⁵ Shortly thereafter, the United States recognized the Laotian and Cambodian governments so it could increase direct military and economic assistance to stem the spread of communism after the fall of China.¹⁶⁶ The flow of PAVN supplies to South Vietnam via the Truon Son Route, better known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, demonstrates the porousness of the borders and the loyalties of the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia.¹⁶⁷ The Ho Chi Minh Trail was costly for the North Vietnamese forces, however, as it required protection and maintenance by 50,000 North Vietnamese troops and 100,000 laborers.¹⁶⁸

The 1952 Geneva Accords had established Laotian neutrality. However, the United States soon created a multibillion-dollar program to aid the Laotian government; the aid increased throughout the conflict in Vietnam.¹⁶⁹ Even so, by late 1960, Laotian policy makers were meeting with Soviet officials to seek assistance in lieu of American support.¹⁷⁰

In Cambodia, the Sihanouk government announced in March 1968 that due to American aggression, Cambodia would support the logistical needs of the North

¹⁶⁴ Thayer, *War Without Fronts*, xxvii.

¹⁶⁵ Timothy N. Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955–1975* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 8.

¹⁶⁶ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 8.

¹⁶⁷ William Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 5.

¹⁶⁸ Tran Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," in *The Vietnam War: An Assessment by South Vietnam's Generals*, ed. Lewis Sorley (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2010), 508. There were three major supply routes by which the North Vietnamese provided logistical support. One is the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A second is the Sihanoukville port route from the port of Sihanoukville across lower Cambodia, perceived as the safest because it was entirely on Cambodian soil. This route was closed by the Khmer regime in 1970 (p. 507). The third are various sea infiltration routes. Between 1965 and 1969, 17 North Vietnamese vessels were detected and sunk. Operation MARKET TIME, conducted in 1969, practically eliminated this method of infiltrating supplies from North Vietnam and China (pp. 508–10).

¹⁶⁹ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 14–16. American involvement in Laos was not limited to Vietnam-based covert operations. With the full cooperation of the Royal Thai government, Thailand was the primary staging point for military aid to Laos, including the CIAs "Air America" program. See pp. 1–2, 29–30.

¹⁷⁰ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 21–22.

Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong.¹⁷¹ When Sihanouk went abroad for medical treatment, he was stripped of his governmental powers. Cambodia demanded that Hanoi immediately remove NVA and VC forces from its territory, triggering the conflict between General Lon Nol's pro-U.S. regime and the North Vietnamese-backed Khmer Rouge.¹⁷² In short, as the American government tried to influence events and thwart communism through various kinds of assistance and a full-scale war in Vietnam, the allegiances of Laos and Cambodia ebbed and flowed.¹⁷³

B. AMERICAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY

American cross-border raids into Laos were surreptitious, while the raids into Cambodia led to full-scale operations by conventional ground forces. Operations Plan 34A, commonly known as OPLAN 34A, was approved by President Johnson in January 1964 and put into motion with the signing of General Order 6, which created the Studies and Observation Group (SOG, MACSOG, or MACVSOG) within the MACV architecture.¹⁷⁴ Based on the poor performance of indigenous tribal spotters the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had recruited in Laos, supplementing native people with U.S. military personnel was deemed critical for interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh trail.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 509.

¹⁷² Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 512–513, and Donald V. Phillips, "Across the Border: The Successes and Failures of Operation Rockcrusher" (Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999), 6.

¹⁷³ Robert M. Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 39–40. Gillespie points out that American involvement in Laos was intended to interdict NVA/VC supplies and manpower flowing to South Vietnam. The Soviets and the Chinese were interested in Laos only because the United States was interested in Laos. In fact, the United States found that landlocked Laos was not a good site for a major conflict with the North Vietnamese, the Soviet Union, or the Chinese.

¹⁷⁴ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 14–15. The Studies and Observation Group (SOG) was composed of five sections: covert naval operations (OP 37), air support (OP 32 and OP 35, the "Air Studies Branch" and the "Air Studies Group"), psychological operations (OP 39), airborne operations (OP 34, responsible for inserting agent teams into North Vietnam), and the Ground Studies Group (OP 35, responsible for reconnaissance and missions in Laos and eventually Cambodia).

¹⁷⁵ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 15. Operation LEAPING LENA was MACV's early attempt, in May 1964, to train five eight-man teams of South Vietnamese Montagnard tribesman led by South Vietnamese Special Forces personnel. Most of the LEAPING LENA personnel were captured or killed, and the few that did return to Vietnam had low-level intelligence of little military value; see pp. 8–9.

Early attempts at cross-border reconnaissance and raids taught the U.S. two lessons. The first is reflected in project DELTA, which fielded combined American and South Vietnamese Special Forces for long-range reconnaissance operations within South Vietnam. In addition, early experiences convinced American military officials that successful covert cross-border operations required direct U.S. military participation.¹⁷⁶ OP 35's primary mission was to identify enemy targets in order to call in air strikes, but U.S. military leaders soon found that these units could also conduct direct-action operations, capture prisoners, plant mines and electronic sensing equipment, and conduct battle damage assessments (BDA) as a result of U.S. bombing strikes.¹⁷⁷ Leaders hoped that the covert operations would convince the North Vietnamese to reconsider their conflict in South Vietnam and their violation of Laotian neutrality.¹⁷⁸

MACVSOG/OP 35 operations in Laos began in 1966 under the name SHINING BRASS.¹⁷⁹ The continued operations required considerable effort from the Royal Lao Army and Air Force, the Hmong army, the Thai volunteers, U.S. Army and Air Force advisors, and CIA operatives (including Air America, and Bird and Sons).¹⁸⁰ OP 35 missions averaged eleven patrols per month in 1966, twenty five per month in 1968, and peaked at over thirty seven patrols per month in 1969.¹⁸¹ The utility of these operations is seen in BDA estimates. In 1969, OP 35 operations resulted in 1016 air strikes, the destruction of 161 structures through direct action, and the death of 718 PAVN soldiers. OP 35 operations forced the NVA to deploy an additional 25,000 men to secure the trail.¹⁸² In one week during 1971, OP 35 teams working with AC-130 gunships

¹⁷⁶ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 9–10.

¹⁷⁷ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 16–17.

¹⁷⁸ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 11.

¹⁷⁹ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 16–21. For operational security reasons, SHINING BRASS operations were renamed PRARIE FIRE in 1967.

¹⁸⁰ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 66. Gillespie points out that between 1963 and 1970 the United States was spending \$80 million per year to provide aid to the Royal Lao Army and to fund its own paramilitary units.

¹⁸¹ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 21.

¹⁸² Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 24.

temporarily halted all traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, effectively producing as much impact as two U.S. infantry battalions.¹⁸³

Although OP 35 operations achieved tactical successes, they never seriously impeded the movement of NVA/VC logistics. It is estimated that the NVA needed only 15 to 60 tons of supplies to support their soldiers in the field—the equivalent, and easily attained goal, of 15 to 60 trucks a day.¹⁸⁴ In April 1972, MACVSOG was shuttered and operations in Laos ceased with President Nixon's Vietnamization policy designed to phase in autonomy for the South Vietnamese military and allow U.S. withdrawal.¹⁸⁵

The Cambodian incursion began in May 1970. It involved one area called the Fishhook and another west of Saigon known as the Angel's Wing or Parrot's Beak.¹⁸⁶ The first cross-border attacks by conventional U.S. forces, Operation Rock Crusher, were a combined U.S.-Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) mission.¹⁸⁷ The U.S. Army's III Corps committed four cavalry squadrons, the 46th Infantry Regiment, and the 25th Infantry Division for reorganization into three infantry-armor task forces.¹⁸⁸ In May and June 1970, American casualties in the Cambodian campaign were 284 killed in action, 2,339 wounded in action, and 13 missing in action, on top of the 800 killed and 3,410 wounded ARVN soldiers.¹⁸⁹

Damage to the NVA/VC war apparatus in Cambodia was not as great as anticipated due to two factors. First, entire NVA/VC regiments had moved west from the

¹⁸³ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 24. MACVSOG started with five recon teams comprised of two U.S. Special Forces soldiers paired with four indigenous team members. See Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 51–52.

¹⁸⁴ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 27.

¹⁸⁵ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 23.

¹⁸⁶ Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 516–517. Dinh Tho gives 6 May 1970 as the beginning of combat operations in Cambodia. However, Keith W. Nolan, *Into Cambodia: Spring Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 98, gives the date of 1 May 1970 as the start of American combat operations in Cambodia. Nolan says that the first American ground combat units to entered Cambodia on 1 May 1970.

Phillips, "Across the Border," 64. Phillips points out that on 29 April 1970, ARVN forces launched the initial cross-border raids again Toan Thang 42 in the Parrot's Beak.

¹⁸⁷ Phillips, "Across the Border," 2.

¹⁸⁸ Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 517.

¹⁸⁹ Nolan, *Into Cambodia*, 433.

border to attack the Royal Cambodian Army. Second, it appears that NVA/VC units anticipated the incursion and were evacuated.¹⁹⁰ Nonetheless, Operation Rock Crusher resulted in the killing of 11,349 enemy fighters, the capture of 2,328 NVA/VC personnel, and the destruction of hundreds of tons of supplies.¹⁹¹ The impact of Operation Rock Crusher continued after American and South Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia. The NVA and VC were psychologically traumatized by the destruction of their sanctuary and were demoralized by the loss of war fighting materials entering from Cambodia.¹⁹² The Americans had accomplished their immediate goals of strengthening defenses with minimal communist interference and denying the NVA/VC their Cambodian safe haven.¹⁹³

C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION

The OP 35 cross-border operations into Laos demonstrated the U.S. forces' intelligence gap. Without concrete evidence to carry out cross-border raids, OP 35 initially sought to compensate for indigenous forces' ineffective reconnaissance operations and inability to call in air strikes against enemy targets.¹⁹⁴ The CIA had little difficulty recruiting Hmong clans to join the covert effort. Facing hostility in the Laotian lowlands after the communists pushed them out of their mountain homes, the Hmong had little choice but to fight.¹⁹⁵ Thus, in the Laotian context, the issue of intelligence was not so much the quantity, but the quality.

¹⁹⁰ Nolan, *Into Cambodia*, 433.

¹⁹¹ Nolan, *Into Cambodia*, 433–434. Although they may have had early warning, NVA elements are estimated to have moved only 400 to 600 tons of supplies out of the target area. More than 600 enemy caches were seized by American and ARVN forces, including weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, uniforms, and vehicles. For example, “enough individual weapons had been captured to equip 55 enemy battalions, enough crew-served weapons to equip 82 enemy battalions, enough small-arms ammunition to provide the basic load for 52,000 enemy soldiers, and enough rice to feed 6 enemy regiments for a year.”

¹⁹² Nolan, *Into Cambodia*, 434.

¹⁹³ Mark Moyer, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 264–265.

¹⁹⁴ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 15.

¹⁹⁵ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 131.

MACVSOG controlled intelligence collection efforts over the border in Cambodia as part of Operation Daniel Boone.¹⁹⁶ Through 1967, Operation Daniel Boone conducted 99 reconnaissance missions into Cambodia, resulting in 297 intelligence reports and two communists captured.¹⁹⁷ By the time of Operation Rock Crusher, the enemy disposition in the area was quite evident. MACVSOG's tactical intelligence was criticized as "worthless" despite the fact that SOG teams had avoided the target areas since October 1969 because NVA defenses within the Fishhook region of Cambodia had become almost impenetrable.¹⁹⁸ In the lead up to Operation Rock Crusher, MACV authorized insertion of SOG recon teams up to thirty kilometers inside Cambodia.¹⁹⁹ In addition to the mixed success of its intelligence collection efforts, MACVSOG was severely hampered by collaboration with South Vietnamese counterparts hired and vetted by the corrupt and compromised South Vietnamese National Police Force.²⁰⁰

D. DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE

The operational area for the Cambodian incursion was determined by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the Cambodian government in April and May 1970, perhaps with U.S. involvement.²⁰¹ The agreement stipulated that U.S. forces would go no deeper than thirty kilometers inside Cambodia, while RVN forces were authorized to operate from forty to sixty kilometers inside Cambodia.²⁰² All U.S. forces were to withdraw from Cambodia on 30 June 1970.²⁰³

¹⁹⁶ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 93 and 121–123. After considerable wrangling between MACVSOG and 5th Special Forces Group as to who should control over-the-border operations in Cambodia, MACVSOG took operational control of Project Sigma and Project Omega from the 5th Special Forces Group. Projects Sigma and Omega were combined teams of American Special Forces soldiers with Cambodian and Nung personnel. Projects Sigma and Omega were initially comprised of nine officers, 65 enlisted men, and 660 indigenous troops each.

¹⁹⁷ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 123. Daniel Boone operations were subsequently changed to Salem House and finally to Thot Not when the South Vietnamese took over the operation in 1972; see Phillips, "Across the Border," 43–44.

¹⁹⁸ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 198–199.

¹⁹⁹ Phillips, "Across the Border," 44–45.

²⁰⁰ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 95.

²⁰¹ Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 515.

²⁰² Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 515.

²⁰³ Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 515.

The U.S. leadership conceptualized the Cambodian incursion as measured in nature, to keep U.S. troop withdrawal plans on schedule. However, the purposes of the incursion were complex and ambitious: to prevent the collapse of the Cambodian Khmer government at the hands of the NVA, to reduce the NVA's ability to fight in both countries, to improve security in South Vietnam while enhancing Vietnamization, and to improve the chances of an early peace settlement.²⁰⁴ Operation Rock Crusher destroyed the illusion of Cambodian neutrality and changed the dynamic of the conflict. What had been simply the Vietnam War became in effect the Second Indochina War.²⁰⁵ The failure to expand the war effort against NVA/VC forces in Laos helped North Vietnam provide logistics to the south; the Laotian campaign wasn't big enough.²⁰⁶ The lack of a conventional military footprint in Laos probably allowed the United States to conduct protracted operations in the region; the counterargument is Cambodia where the conventional military conduct of operations brought additional international attention.

E. AMERICAN POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

United States policy prevented the U.S. forces from conducting large-scale military actions in Cambodia while Prince Sihanouk was in power.²⁰⁷ Despite U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, the Cambodian campaign created the perception that the war was expanding.²⁰⁸ American casualties had the greatest effect on public approval of the President and his Vietnam policy.²⁰⁹ The political implications of the Cambodian incursion reverberated throughout Washington and the United States. To some in Washington, Cambodia was "the straw that broke the camel's back."²¹⁰ Protests erupted

²⁰⁴ Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 514.

²⁰⁵ Phillips, "Across the Border," 4.

²⁰⁶ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 136.

²⁰⁷ Dinh Tho, "The Cambodian Incursion," 515.

²⁰⁸ Phillips, "Across the Border," 6.

²⁰⁹ Mark Lorell, Charles Kelley, and Deborah Hensler, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1985), 21–22.

²¹⁰ John M. Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2005), 154.

across American college campuses, including Kent State and Jackson State where protestors were shot and killed by military and law enforcement officials. The political controversy reached a head in Congress, where legislators were angered by the apparent power imbalance between the legislative and executive branches.²¹¹ The manner in which the Cambodian offensive was planned, conducted, and politically portrayed damaged Richard Nixon's presidency both domestically and internationally.²¹²

The worsening military situation in Laos in the late 1960s threatened to turn the covert paramilitary war into a conventional one.²¹³ The military activity in Laos was essentially a shadow war.²¹⁴ U.S. politicians quickly identified the political ramifications of conducting a secret war in Laos. American diplomats in Laos were tasked with publicly proclaiming American adherence to Laotian neutrality while secretly directing a covert war.²¹⁵ Despite the negative connotations of American military involvement in Laos, America's Laotian policy did solidify Thai-U.S. relations and provided a military base of operations for years to come.²¹⁶

F. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION

The Johnson administration, to prevent accusations that America was expanding the Vietnam conflict, decided against using conventional ground forces to interdict North Vietnamese forces along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.²¹⁷ The war in Laos was basically hidden

²¹¹ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 153–154. To curtail the executive branch, the McGovern-Hatfield Act sought to cut off all funds for U.S. military operations in Indochina by the end of 1971, while the Cooper-Church Amendment aimed to suspend funds after 30 June 1971 for training the Khmer Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Khmeres, or FANK). Both bills failed to pass both houses and congressional discontentment waned when U.S. troops withdrew from Cambodia in June.

²¹² Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 154–155. Shaw states that Nixon and his closest advisors “put political expediency ahead of the law,” implying that Nixon's disregard for the rule of law permitted illegal actions that ultimately forced him to resign.

²¹³ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 133.

²¹⁴ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 134.

²¹⁵ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 131–132. Following Ambassador Leonard Unger, Ambassador William Sullivan asserted the separation of the Vientiane Country Team and the Lao War from any connection with MACV. This separation created additional overt legitimacy insofar as it allowed the U.S. to openly support the 1962 Geneva Accords.

²¹⁶ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 137.

²¹⁷ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 1.

from the public and continued until around 1972.²¹⁸ It was an interagency effort among the Departments of State and Defense, and the CIA. The overt military apparatus in Vietnam (MACV) was mostly out of the decision making process.²¹⁹ This arrangement permitted greater deniability. The story in Vietnam monopolized media attention. The American contribution to the defense of Laos helped persuade the Laotian government to permit U.S. cross-border operations.²²⁰

President Nixon's failure to properly prepare his cabinet members and the American public for the American foray into Cambodia added to the political distress that beset his presidency in 1970. Just days before the incursion began, Secretary of State William P. Rogers testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had no intention of conducting military operations in Cambodia.²²¹ Rogers told the truth as he knew it; Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger deliberately excluded him from all discussions of the imminent operation.²²² Congress, and by extension the American public, believed the Nixon administration had intentionally lied. Nixon tried to salvage his public image in the wake of the Cambodian campaign in a talk on 30 June, the day that all U.S. forces left Cambodia. He made four key points: North Vietnam brought the war to Cambodia, the NVA contributed to Sihanouk's downfall, Sihanouk's government and the Cambodian National Assembly deposed Sihanouk, and the United States endured the blatant violation of Cambodian neutrality for five years as the NVA/VC used Cambodia as a major base.²²³ But after years of war, thousands of

²¹⁸ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 137.

²¹⁹ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 131–133.

²²⁰ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 134.

²²¹ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 154.

²²² Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 154.

²²³ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 155.

casualties, and serious challenges to his own legitimacy, Nixon's attempt to justify the American attacks in Cambodia did not resonate with his American audience.²²⁴

G. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE

The conduct and nature of the cross-border force can mitigate the negative consequences of size and duration. From 1967 to 1970, SOG recon teams conducted 1,300 patrols into Cambodia as part of the Daniel Boone/Salem House mission.²²⁵ The SOG missions did not grab the headlines like Operation Rock Crusher and it is easy to see why. Between late April and late June 1970, 109,267 ARVN and American soldiers crossed the border into Cambodia.²²⁶ Operation Rock Crusher was a brief part of the overall Vietnam conflict, but the sheer number of uniformed conventional forces crossing the border overshadowed the relatively short duration of their mission. In contrast, a large number of personnel conducted cross-border operations into Laos for six years, albeit with a different *modus operandi*. The SOG missions in Cambodia and Laos show the value of small-unit operations. Partnering with indigenous forces and shedding standard-issue uniforms can increase force protection for the ground force and mitigate political repercussions.²²⁷

²²⁴ Lorrell, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy*, 79. Lorrell concludes "that initial levels of public support for U.S. involvement in a prolonged and indecisive limited conflict cannot be maintained indefinitely if substantial numbers of U.S. casualties continue to be generated." Combined with the low domestic political standing of the Nixon administration, partially resulting from the conduct of the Cambodian incursion (see section "E" of this chapter), it is evident why Nixon was unable to prevent decreasing domestic support.

²²⁵ Phillips, "Across the Border," 44.

²²⁶ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 158.

²²⁷ Phillips, "Across the Border," 43. SOG teams were often armed with AK-47 rifles and wore the black pajamas of the Viet Cong. These patrols were also "sterilized" of personal identification and faced years of imprisonment on top of a \$10,000 fine for disclosing any part of the mission. In the view of this author, while a Caucasian American is arguably easy to identify when standing beside his indigenous counterpart, the lack of identifiable information on the person does allow *some* deniability for senior military and government officials attempting to deny the existence of the operation. At the very least, it may buy decision makers time to generate an information campaign to diffuse the situation both domestically and internationally.

H. NATIONAL WILL

In 1954, the decision to support Ngo Dinh Diem and a unified Vietnam seemed sensible in light of the 1949 Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb and the communist victory in China.²²⁸ The American public found the war in Vietnam an acceptable response to perceived communist threats that might endanger the United States.²²⁹ This view is reflected in American news coverage of Vietnam. At first the news was predominantly pro-war, but support waned and anti-war coverage became more prevalent after the 1968 Tet Offensive.²³⁰ The American media reporting of the war casualties may be partially responsible for growing anti-war sentiment.²³¹ New broadcasts of wounded and dying servicemen contributed to the decline in public support for the war. A lesson from Vietnam is that with widespread public support in the initial phases of a limited war, government officials can be lulled into complacency and not recognize problems that emerge when the number of casualties grows.²³²

In conclusion, the cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia were not the only factor behind the changed direction of American involvement, but these operations did contribute to the change in U.S. policy. Both operations were seen by the public as an expansion of the war, and the additional deaths negated the incursions' tactical and operational accomplishments.

²²⁸ Fredrik Logevall, *The Origins of the Vietnam War* (Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 33. This takes into consideration current American domestic policies, the globalization of the Cold War, and the plan to involve a few hundred American advisors backed with a few hundred million dollars in aid.

²²⁹ John Mueller, "Public Support for Military Ventures Abroad: Evidence From the Polls," in *The Real Lessons of the Vietnam War: Reflections Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of Saigon*, ed. John N. Moore and Robert F. Turner (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 174–175. President Johnson was presented with a 50/50 likelihood of rapid success in Vietnam.

²³⁰ Adam J. Berinsky, "Public Opinion During the Vietnam War: A Revised Measure of the Public Will" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 18–21 April 2001), 12, <http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/berin01.pdf>.

²³¹ Lorell, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy*, 24. According to a July 1967 poll, "Loss of our young men/casualties/loss of lives/killing" garnered 31 percent of total responses while the next two closest responses were "We are not making any apparent progress/should escalate/taking so long to end" with 12 percent and "don't understand the war/why we are fighting/it's a senseless war" had nine percent; see Table 2, p. 25. After the Tet offensive, in a similar poll that asked Americans the most troubling aspects of the Vietnam War, the response rate for "boys being killed/casualties/too young to die/loss of human life/deaths" went up to 44 percent.

²³² Lorell, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy*, 79.

I. THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF AMERICAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Cross-border operations in Laos and Cambodia decreased as the United States stepped up its withdrawal from Vietnam. The war in Laos was always fought in the shadow of Vietnam, so when the United States indicated its pending departure from Vietnam in 1972 it was clear that Laotian operations would also cease.²³³ Operation Rock Crusher was a singular event in the conventional force fight in Cambodia, and MACVSOG operations ended with its deactivation in 1972.²³⁴ As noted above, SOG/SOF/CIA cross-border operations had been conducted since the start of hostilities and thus their timing is not as significant in this analysis. However, the timing of Operation Rock Crusher had significant repercussions, both positive and negative.

The communist North Vietnamese were surprised at the United States' refusal to enter Cambodia earlier than 1970; they did not view the action as immoral and admitted they would have done the same if they were in the position of the U.S.²³⁵ On the one hand, the operation resulted in public outcry and accusations of war expansion and fed the urgency to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. On the other hand, the operation effectively delayed the communist takeover of South Vietnam by at least a year.²³⁶ The operation allowed time for additional training and equipping of ARVN forces to deter NVA aggression while permitting the United States to withdraw its forces and avoid an explicit military defeat.²³⁷

²³³ Castle, *At War in the Shadow of Vietnam*, 134. The February 1973 Vientiane Agreement stopped U.S. bombing in Laos, and once the new Lao coalition government was formed Air America and the Thai forces were expelled from Laos.

²³⁴ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 222, 241, 247. In March 1972, MACVSOG's dedicated air support and task forces were dissolved and it was no longer capable of conducting operations. Many of MACVSOG's missions were then transferred to other elements within MACV.

²³⁵ Moyar, *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey*, 264.

²³⁶ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 161.

²³⁷ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 161.

J. SUMMARY

The Laotian and Cambodian cross-border operations affected the war in Vietnam both internally and externally. Both campaigns sought to deny external sanctuaries the enemy needed.²³⁸ The Cambodian incursion was correctly described by President Nixon as “the most successful military operation of the Vietnam War.”²³⁹ However, American casualties and cries of war expansion overshadowed the operation’s tactical and operational successes; Laotian operations added fuel to the fire. Some internal reviews of the Cambodian campaign claim that the restrictions on the dissemination of MACVSOG Cambodia-intelligence products meant that the intelligence had value only for MACV analysts. The excessive security kept conventional ground units from getting information that could help them locate enemy caches and base camps.²⁴⁰ Overall, the small-unit operations of MACVSOG in Laos and Cambodia demonstrate the successful and efficient collection of intelligence and execution of direct action raids under strict political restrictions.²⁴¹ The major lesson that many U.S. officials drew from the Vietnam War is that future interventions in Third World countries should be brief and decisive.²⁴²


²³⁸ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 163. Less than a week after the U.S. withdrew its conventional force from Cambodia, MACV issued a report that detailed Hanoi’s reliance on Cambodia for feeding its soldiers in South Vietnam. MACV estimated that NVA/VC forces required 800 tons of food per month, of which 480 to 640 tons came from North Vietnamese sympathizers in eastern Cambodia. Therefore, after the operation Hanoi had to transit nearly ninety percent of its food requirements from the north along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

²³⁹ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 153.

²⁴⁰ Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign*, 166.

²⁴¹ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam*, 221. MACVSOG operators criticized the restrictions placed upon them from the onset. The direction of approach, location of launch sites, limited number of useable landing zones, and depth of penetration were all identified as shortcomings that made operations predictable and increased American and South Vietnamese casualties. However, these restrictions did lead to the use of Thai launch sites, High Altitude Low Open (HALO) parachute insertions, and mobile launch sites. Many of these techniques, tactics, and procedures were adopted by the U.S. Army’s Delta Force; see p. 260.

²⁴² Lorell, *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy*, 80.



SOURCE: Shultz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, p. 211. Map reproduced by John Plaster.

Figure 6. MACVSOG Areas of Operations in Laos²⁴³

²⁴³ Rosenau, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets*, 19.



Figure 7. Military Special Operations: Areas of Command and Control²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ Douglas Pike, John Prados, et al., *The Vietnam Experience: War in the Shadows* (Boston: Boston Publishing, 1988), 89, found in Robert M. Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), x.




Figure 8. Cambodian Campaign, Fishhook, and Parrot's Beak²⁴⁵

²⁴⁵ "File: Map Cambodian Incursion May 70 from USMA.jpg," last modified 7 April 2008, accessed 30 April 2013, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2f/Map_Cambodian_Incursion_May_70_from_USMA.jpg/800px-Map_Cambodian_Incursion_May_70_from_USMA.jpg.

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VII. AFGHANISTAN (1978–1992)

The Soviet counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is an example of a major power thwarted by guerrillas.²⁴⁶ The USSR focused its counterinsurgency campaign within the borders of Afghanistan. It was an open secret that the United States was supplying military aid to mujahedeen fighters in Pakistan. Nonetheless the Soviets practiced a containment policy, with sporadic artillery and air strikes and a number of ground-based operations against insurgent base camps in the porous Pakistan/Afghanistan border region. This chapter demonstrates that small scale cross-border raids can be conducted without extensive negative repercussions. The case of the Soviets in Afghanistan shows how to mitigate the political cost of cross-border raids where the insurgent sanctuaries are supported by a powerful external actor.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Afghan insurgency began in April 1978 with the removal of President Mohammed Daoud Khan by the Afghan communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Within the next year and half, the PDPA lost control of 23 of the 28 Afghan provinces.²⁴⁷ Fearing the downfall of a neighboring pro-communist state, the Soviet Union launched a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. A decade later, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan after a flawed counterinsurgency campaign, intense international scrutiny and numerous allegations of atrocities against the Afghan people.²⁴⁸

The allegiances Afghanistan's neighbors were quite dynamic prior to the Soviet invasion. Pakistan, the key mujahedeen sanctuary, was unallied; it eventually sided with the United States, calling the invasion a violation of Muslim state sovereignty by a

²⁴⁶ Paul, *Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, 11.

²⁴⁷ Paul, *Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, 12.

²⁴⁸ Bill Keller, "Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, 16 February 1989, accessed 25 February 2013, <http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/021689afghan-laden.html>.

superpower.²⁴⁹ Iran had just expelled western powers with the onset of its own revolution. The Iranians provided safe haven to Afghan insurgents but their support was not as robust as the American aid to Afghan guerrillas in Pakistan.²⁵⁰ While the 550-mile Iran/Afghan border made it impossible for Iran to completely avoid the war completely, their attention was focused on their war with Iraq.²⁵¹ Land routes into Afghanistan from China were cut off in Soviet-controlled Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.²⁵²

B. SOVIET CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND SECURITY

The Soviets threatened to invade Pakistan and Iran with “hot pursuit” raids into Pakistan as early as 1982.²⁵³ In December 1981 the Soviets were already conducting combined air and ground operations to cut off insurgent supply routes in the frontier regions.²⁵⁴ By 1983 the Pakistan/Afghan frontier had become a vast administrative base where the mujahedeen could acquire arms, train, receive medical attention and resettle their families.²⁵⁵ The Soviet approach to the Pakistani sanctuary included diplomatic threats backed by air raids and artillery barrages, buying off tribal leaders in border areas, and sealing the border with guard towers, fences and minefields.²⁵⁶ The Soviets also used Afghan surrogates in cross-border raids. One example is a 1981 incursion three miles

²⁴⁹ Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947–2004,” *PILDAT*, briefing paper no. 11 (2004), 19, accessed 25 February 2013, http://www.millat.com/democracy/Foreign%20Policy/Briefing_Paper_english_11.pdf. Up to this point, Pakistan had fallen out with the United States as a result of Pakistan’s agreement with France to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant. See *PILDAT* briefing paper no. 11, p. 18.

²⁵⁰ Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains,” accessed 25 February 2013, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/miredinmount.htm>. Originally published in *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 17, no. 1 (2004).

²⁵¹ Thomas A. Bruscino, “Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare,” *Global War On Terrorism Occasional Paper* 17 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 55, accessed 25 February 2013, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/bruscino.pdf>.

²⁵² Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 56.

²⁵³ Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 56, and “Soviets Mired in Afghanistan,” *The Telegraph-Herald*, 26 December 1982, 38, accessed 24 February 2013, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=zyVRAAAAIBAJ&sjid=wt8MAAAAIBAJ&pg=2940,3557569&dq=soviet+hot+pursuit+raid+pakistan&hl=en>.

²⁵⁴ Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 62.

²⁵⁵ Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 57–58.

²⁵⁶ Bruscino, “Out of Bounds,” 61.

inside Pakistan by approximately 40 Afghans.²⁵⁷ By 1986, Soviet forces were skilled at attacking guerrilla sanctuaries and established a 30-mile deep no-man's-land on the border.²⁵⁸ This forced mujahedeen fighters deeper into the Afghan refugee camps inside Pakistan, at least until the introduction of surface-to-air missiles.²⁵⁹

C. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INFORMATION

The scope of Soviet cross-border operations from 1981 through 1986 indicates robust intelligence on insurgent sanctuaries. An indirect indicator of Soviet intelligence proficiency is the intelligence agencies' use of Afghan surrogates to conduct attacks inside refugee camps and Pakistani towns.²⁶⁰ The highly coordinated Soviet and Afghan offensive into the Parrot's Beak border area in August 1985 shows that the Soviets could identify insurgent cross-border sanctuaries well within Pakistan. The operation was so successful in locating guerrilla base camps that it cleared the area of mujahedeen fighters.²⁶¹

D. DURATION, OPERATIONAL AREA AND FORCE SIZE

Soviet cross-border raids were generally quickly timed actions with limited objectives. They therefore combine operational duration, area, and size. Because the Soviets adopted a policy of "hot pursuit" with the rapid infiltration of helicopter-borne commandos and fighter aircraft, the duration of cross-border operations was almost

²⁵⁷ "Afghan Troops Raid Pakistan Town," *The Telegraph-Herald*, 8 September 1981, 16, accessed 26 February 2013, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=NRIRAAAIBAJ&sjid=CvgMAAAIBAJ&pg=6710,948935&dq=soviet+hot+pursuit+raid+pakistan&hl=en>.

²⁵⁸ Bruscino, "Out of Bounds," 62–64. Bruscino points out that the combined raids were a joint effort between fighter jets and helicopter gunships (Mi-24 HIND gunships had troop carrying capacity) and troop transport helicopters, specifically mentioning helicopter borne commandos, p. 59. It is not expressed specifically whether these helicopter borne commandos participated directly in all cross-border raids. For the purposes of this study, the assumption is made that they did in fact participate in a large percentage of such operations, but without expressed written information the exact number of operations, or a direct percentage cannot be determined.

²⁵⁹ Scott R. McMichael, "The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War," *Parameters* 19, no. 4 (December 1989), 31. Through 1985, as many as 700 Soviet helicopters were destroyed on the ground and in the air. The introduction of U.S. Stinger missiles greatly increased the threat to Soviet aircraft.

²⁶⁰ Bruscino, "Out of Bounds," 61.

²⁶¹ Bruscino, "Out of Bounds," 62.

always brief, a few hours or at most a day. The area which the Soviets could occupy during these raids was small. (The Parrot's Beak attack is an exception, [not to be confused with the area of the same name in Cambodia]. The duration and size of the operation is unknown, but a two-pronged attack in such a large area would require several days at least.) The force stayed within prescribed limits on the mission's area of operation and duration. In a March 1986 raid, the 334th and 154th Spetsnaz battalions reportedly sustained casualties of at least 60 killed and two missing in action over four days.²⁶² It appears that the Soviet rarely if exceeded a few days of temporary cross-border occupation.

With an inadequate force size and structure, the Soviets could not control key terrain for long periods.²⁶³ They never deployed more than 200,000 Soviet and Soviet-backed Afghan soldiers in the Afghan conflict. At its peak, upwards of 85 percent of the Soviet force provided basic security, leaving 18,000 to 23,000 soldiers to conduct counterinsurgency operations.²⁶⁴ Small helicopter-borne raiding parties aside, the Soviets utilized an assault force tailored around battalion-sized operations. It is not known how many battalion-sized operations occurred in addition to the Parrots Beak and March 1986 Spetsnaz operations.²⁶⁵

In short, the Soviets gained tangible security benefits from short-term cross-border raids by small forces on focused operational areas. Their increased reliance on air power bombing raids was frustrated by the introduction of Stinger missiles, which proved crucial for keeping open the logistical lines between Pakistan and Afghanistan.²⁶⁶

²⁶² Grau and Jalali, "Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta," 327–334.

²⁶³ Charles E. Dudik, "The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower's Inability to Deny Insurgent Sanctuary" (Master's thesis, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 2009), 15.

²⁶⁴ Dudik, "The Soviet-Afghan War," 12, and McMichael, "The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War," 29.

²⁶⁵ McCarl, "Sandinista Counterinsurgency Tactics," 104.

²⁶⁶ Bruscino, "Out of Bounds," 67.

E. SOVIET POLITICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

The Soviets conducted cross-border raids to isolate the guerrillas from external support.²⁶⁷ They identified the sanctuary in Pakistan as critical to the mujahedeen resistance.²⁶⁸ However, the Soviets already faced intense international scrutiny of their invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet/Afghan cross-border raids into Pakistan lent additional weight to U.S. condemnation and strengthened Pakistani resolve. The tenacity with which the Soviets attacked the sanctuaries resulted in U.S. diplomatic actions that raised the political costs to the Soviet Union.

F. STRATEGIC-LEVEL INFORMATION

The international community's strong condemnation of the Soviet occupation emphasized that cross-border raids were an additional violation of international law. The Soviet air attacks into Pakistan received extensive media coverage that fed criticism of Soviet activities.²⁶⁹ However, the mention of small-scale cross-border raids appears to have received little international attention. The March 1986 Spetsnaz raid was barely mentioned in the April 1986 *Pakistani Strategic Studies Review*. It is possible the raid did not become a larger political issue because the Pakistani authorities did not know of the operation, or simply did not want to make an issue of it.²⁷⁰ Although the Soviet 40th Army barred future attacks on Krer, reportedly because the March raid was unsanctioned, the Soviet forces again attacked the Krer base camp in December 1987. The success of the Soviets' small-scale raids may be due to their politically costly large-scale bombing campaign.

²⁶⁷ Dudik, "The Soviet-Afghan War," 18.

²⁶⁸ Dudik, "The Soviet-Afghan War," 1.

²⁶⁹ Mark Fineman, "Border Raids Threaten Afghan Pact: Both Soviets and Pakistanis Allege Violations of Accords," *The Los Angeles Times*, 01 October 1988, accessed 24 February 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-01/news/mn-4269_1_pakistani-border.

²⁷⁰ Grau, "Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta," 8.

G. DURATION AND FORCE SIZE

The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan was one more instance of the Soviets taking military control of a neighboring country after World War II. The invasion generated strong political resistance from the United States.²⁷¹ The expansion of the war into Pakistan lent credence to the United States' rhetoric against communist expansionism. Because the USSR flagrantly violated Pakistani sovereignty hundreds of times within a few months, it became increasingly difficult for the Soviets to counteract U.S. news reports of increased border violations. The relatively small force size had little direct influence on the rhetoric compared to the overall duration of Soviet cross-border raids. Persistent and repeated short-duration attacks looked like a single continuous event composed of numerous small engagements. The series of small force, short term, limited raids meant that no single event could be pegged as the Soviets making good on their threat to invade Pakistan.

H. NATIONAL WILL

Sometime in 1987 the Soviet leadership determined that their army would never leave Afghanistan with a legitimate, viable PDPA regime.²⁷² Political factors that contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan include the narrow base of Afghan support for the PDPA, greater unity within Afghan society, and the mujahedeen's cohesiveness and combat effectiveness. Also important were American bipartisan support for aid to the guerrillas, and Pakistan's commitment to the Afghan resistance despite Soviet attempts at intimidation.²⁷³ In the end, it wasn't so much that the costs of staying in Afghanistan outweighed the costs of leaving. Rather, the costs of staying in Afghanistan outweighed the USSR's long term domestic and global interests.²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 121–122.

²⁷² Tad Daley, "Afghanistan and Gorbachev's Global Foreign Policy," *Occasional Papers* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), 2–3.

²⁷³ Daley, "Afghanistan and Gorbachev's Global Foreign Policy," 3.

²⁷⁴ Daley, "Afghanistan and Gorbachev's Global Foreign Policy," 2.

The Soviets' domestic and international status was severely damaged by their actions in Afghanistan, and their violation of Pakistani sovereignty exacerbated the problem. The invasion of Afghanistan led to embargoes on grain and advanced technology with varying degrees of impact on Soviet domestic conditions. The invasion also affected the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II (SALT II) treaty, stalling its progress through the U.S. Senate.²⁷⁵ Finally, the invasion helped justify increased U.S. arms spending, thus escalating the arms race and burdening the already fragile Soviet economy.²⁷⁶

I. THE TIMING AND TERMINATION OF SOVIET CROSS-BORDER RAIDS IN PAKISTAN

The timing of the Soviet cross-border raids is best summarized as successful in thwarting guerrilla operations early in the war, but extremely costly from a political viewpoint. The early raids produced extensive security gains as mujahedeen fighters retreated away from the border. But the fact that the Soviets entered Pakistan early on helped justify charges of gross disregard for Pakistani sovereignty. The violation of territorial sovereignty created sympathy for Pakistan and led to greater material support for the insurgents.

Cross-border air attacks continued through at least August 1988.²⁷⁷ It seems clear that the frequency of cross-border operations over a period of at least seven years created a political burden that hastened the Soviet withdrawal. It appears that cross-border raids by ground troops were scaled back in response to the depth of the strikes, as well as the reduction of Soviet combat forces in the theater.

J. SUMMARY

The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan not because of a military defeat, but because of a military stalemate, internal political dynamics and external pressures.²⁷⁸ To

²⁷⁵ Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan*, 173.

²⁷⁶ Dudik, "The Soviet-Afghan War," 18–19.

²⁷⁷ Fineman, "Border Raids Threaten Afghan Pact."

²⁷⁸ Milan Hauer, *The Soviet War in Afghanistan: Patterns of Russian Imperialism* (Philadelphia, PA: University Press of America, 1991), 108.

suggest that cross-border raids were the major cause of Soviet withdrawal would give too much credit to U.S. diplomacy and too little credit to the failure of the Soviets' ruthless counter-insurgency campaign.²⁷⁹ The initial cross-border raids yielded significant security gains, but the political costs mounted as the Soviets expanded their forays into Pakistan. The rare mention of small-unit cross-border operations implies that, even under great scrutiny, such raids can be successful at little political cost if they are limited in scope and duration. Whether this is true of the Soviet cross-border raids in the Afghan war cannot be determined because the ground operations were overshadowed by a large aerial bombing campaign during the same period. But the fact that these ground-based operations attracted little international condemnation indicates that some such raids can be conducted with impunity.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan*, 165.

²⁸⁰ "Afghan Troops Raid Pakistan Town," *The Telegraph-Herald*. In response to a September 1981 Afghan raid, Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq said that cross-border intrusions are something "we have to live with." The 1986 Spetsnaz attack on the Krer mujahedeen camp was barely acknowledged by Pakistani government officials and the international community.



Figure 9. Sanctuaries on the Afghanistan/Pakistan Border.²⁸¹

²⁸¹ Thomas A. Bruscino, "Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare," *Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 17* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 51.



Figure 10. Parrot's Beak Region on Afghanistan/Pakistan Border.²⁸²

²⁸² Bruscino, "Out of Bounds," 63.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS AND POLITICAL COST REDUCTION LESSONS

In a successful cross-border raid, the security gain must outweigh the political cost. Every cross-border raid will involve some political cost, but these costs can sometimes be mitigated through diplomatic means and diligent strategic and operational-level planning. While there are no hard and fast rules for lowering the political costs associated with cross-border raids, a comparison of the different types of raids suggests that some are more likely to minimize these costs. The cases of cross-border raids presented in this thesis have both common and unique characteristics that suggest guidelines for political cost reduction.

Characteristics of Cross-Border Raids	Political Costs	Political Cost Reduction Lessons
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Small in size- Generally a good intelligence picture- Mixed results- Often done in cooperation with Thai police	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- None? International aid and diplomacy enabled the Thais to cooperate with the British.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Strategic containment through diplomatic means (e.g. SEATO)- Importance of indigenous intelligence- Operational autonomy for ground units

Table 3. Security/Political Cost Lessons: Malaya (1948–1960)

Characteristics of Cross-Border Raids	Political Costs	Political Cost Reduction Lessons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large military footprint - Good intelligence - Good tactical BDA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong condemnation from the U.S. (increased aid to the Contras, etc.) - Honduran government felt threatened (retaliates militarily, etc.) - Pressures the Soviets/Cubans (risk is not worth the gain) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large overt actions; early warning - Good intelligence - Directly impeded insurgent operations within Nicaragua

Table 4. Security/Political Cost Lessons: Nicaragua (1981–1990)

Characteristics of Cross-Border Raids	Political Costs	Political Cost Reduction Lessons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Small in size - One covert and one overt operation - Limited duration - Good intelligence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong condemnation from neighboring nations and the international community - Undermined domestic support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information Operations/framing the operation within the larger military/political framework - Reduction in collateral damage better controlled with precision strikes or ground units - Combined operations can reduce international condemnation

Table 5. Security/Political Cost Lessons: Algeria (1954–1962)

Characteristics of Cross-Border Raids	Political Costs	Political Cost Reduction Lessons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large in size - Occupied Angola - Cross-border occupation strengthened indigenous intelligence collection - Often combined with indigenous security forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong condemnation from the U.S. (cut off military aid to SADF) - Strong condemnation from Cuba (increased aid to the Angolan government; Cuba involved in strikes against SADF) - Internationally isolated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Framed cross-border raids in an anti-communist narrative - Did not overstep international redlines (e.g., announced limit of advance for SADF by Cuban forces)

Table 6. Security/Political Cost Lessons: Namibia (1960–1989)

Characteristics of Cross-Border Raids	Political Costs	Political Cost Reduction Lessons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally small in size - Mostly covert - One large overt operation - Good intelligence - Combined U.S./indigenous operations - Joint and interagency approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Undermined legitimacy of the U.S. president (war expansion) - U.S. casualties undermined public support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Good intelligence (e.g., combined patrols and interagency partnership) - Strategic containment (covert operations in cooperation with neighboring countries) - Importance of U.S. vetted/collected intelligence with indigenous personnel - Operational autonomy (MACVSOG)

Table 7. Security/Political Cost Lessons: South Vietnam (1960–1975)

Characteristics of Cross-Border Raids	Political Costs	Political Cost Reduction Lessons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally small in size - Short duration - No occupation - Good intelligence - Cross-border campaign was expanded; included aerial bombardment and artillery barrages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong condemnation from the U.S. (e.g. Stinger missiles and sanctions) - Strong condemnation from Pakistan (actively facilitated transfer of U.S. arms) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diversions to mask intent - Robust intelligence - Never occupied Pakistan

Table 8. Security/Political Cost Lessons: Afghanistan (1978–1992)

Interesting trends within the context of each individual conflict can be seen on both the political and security-return scales. The scales imply that some techniques can be successful when the nuances are taken into account. In the category of security returns (information, duration, operational area, and force), the independent and dependent variables fall on the low end in the Algerian and Malayan conflicts. In the Algerian case, the independent variable, expenditures, were limited by the inward focus of the counterinsurgency campaign. The same can be said for the Malayan insurgency. Surprisingly, the well-executed internally-focused control measures outweighed the security gains from cross-border raids. If possibly more emphasis had been placed on any of the independent variables, the effectiveness of the cross-border operations might have increased.

Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Afghanistan are interesting because they all are close to ideal locations on the scales. This implies that they were competent and efficient at integrating cross-border raids into their counterinsurgency strategy. In these cases, the Cold War added to the urgency when a superpower became involved to thwart the advances of their Cold War adversary. In some instances, the principal actors' activities were not particularly egregious, but were used as political tools to pressure the actor internationally.




Figure 11. Applied Security Environment

Skewed results are more common in the politics subcategories. The variables of national will and information show strikingly skewed results. All of the conflicts except Malaya contained events like human rights atrocities or a changing domestic political landscape that greatly influenced domestic or international information processing. At the same time, these nations' own strategic narratives were not entirely in line with public opinion and were often inconsistent with the true intent of the counterinsurgency. In all of these cases, state actors failed to produce sound, explicit strategic messaging that could deflect external pressure and quell domestic discontent. The Soviet Union was close to the ideal location in terms of information, but this was somewhat deceptive given the oppressive nature of Soviet society.

The duration and force size charts indicate that short duration operations and small force size increase political returns. These cases include Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua for both variables and Malaya for the force size variable. Vietnam and Afghanistan pushed the limits of duration and are on the slope of diminishing returns. Both increased their cross-border operations almost exponentially; both tried for the quick win instead of a more deliberate covert action plan. This does mean that a "go big,

or go home” covert action plan for cross-border incursions from day one is most advantageous. Short duration individual operations can be sustained for a prolonged period if combined with appropriate diplomatic efforts. The Sandinistas also kept their operations short. It is likely that both Honduras and Pakistan were emboldened to stand against cross-border raids by their neighbors only because of American involvement.




Figure 12. Applied Political Environment

B. THE TIMING OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS

The timing of cross-border raids does not have a direct correlation with their success within a larger counterinsurgency campaign. The way that timing a cross-border raid reduces political costs and increases security gains is through the actual execution of the operation, rather than the timing. For the most part, however, the greatest security gains and lowest political cost are found when cross-border raids come early in the conflict. This is probably because the international community is overwhelmed by the news at the start of a war. The details of cross-border operations pale in comparison to headlines about the larger conflict.

Namibia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan are examples where early cross-border campaigns with greater latitude for execution produced measureable security gains. In the

case of Vietnam, the Laotian campaign's effectiveness was only as good as the manpower committed. The Cambodian campaign's later execution allowed for considerable security gains, but was politically costly. Malayan/Thai cross-border raids began somewhat later in the counterinsurgency paradigm, producing minimal security gains at limited political cost. France's only true cross-border operation, Sakiet, was conducted after an effective barrier was established; it produced minimal security gains at extensive political cost. Lastly, the Sandinista raids into Honduras had considerable security gains in terms of the counterinsurgency, but detrimental effects in terms of political costs including stepped-up American involvement and retaliatory strikes by the Honduran government.




Figure 13. Strategic and Operational Implications

The lessons for reducing political costs and increasing security gains in the conduct of cross-border raids involve internal and external actions at both the strategic and operational levels. The actions to mitigate political costs must be taken before, during, and after the execution of the operation.

C. INTERNAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Because they require continuity in information, training, and expertise, internal operational measures generally reoccur throughout the duration of activities and post-conflict. The existence of dedicated raid units allows cross-border raids to be conducted

early in a conflict because no time is needed to establish headquarters and strike forces capable of managing and executing the operational requirements. The Soviets' helicopter-borne operations early in the Afghan conflict provide the best example of this technique. The United States in Vietnam validated the effectiveness of pairing Army Green Berets with indigenous forces for cross-border operations. The grueling selection of Green Berets and their unconventional warfare training meshed well the requirements for such combined unconventional operations.

Joint military and interagency cooperation is another internal factor that requires recurring collaboration. The advantage of a joint/interagency approach is seen in the Malayan and Vietnam case studies. In both conflicts, the joint/interagency approach helped bridge the gap between military objectives, reducing political costs by bringing the whole-of-government approach to support execution of tactical activities. In both cases, the diplomatic efforts at strategic-level containment supported combined efforts at operational positioning of forces, mission planning, and execution. Thailand provided security forces for border operations during the Malayan conflict and the Vietnam War as a result of the interagency/whole-of-government approach. Thailand's involvement eased British political costs in Malaya and advanced U.S. in Laos during the Vietnam War.

Internal factors to consider during cross-border raids include both conflict-specific aspects and chronic states. Operational autonomy and flexibility must be an enduring condition. This old lesson bears repeating. Special Operations forces must have the latitude to execute operations apart from the conventional fight (in this context, a conventional fight refers to operations within the borders of the disputed country). The nuances of cross-border operations require coordination and skills not normally fostered within the conventional force; again Vietnam is a prime example. Conventional forces may be able to augment operations without increasing political costs (the Soviets in Afghanistan or the British and Australians in Malaya are examples). Important here is the delineation of command at the operational level so that the forces can properly support

the desired end state. The over-synchronization of SOF and conventional forces should be avoided so SOF do not become too “conventionalized” and lose their effectiveness.²⁸³

The more nuanced conflict-specific considerations within the internal dynamic arise with synchronization between conventional units and the units conducting cross-border raids and diversion operations. There are two requirements for synchronization between these different units. First, the cross-border operations should support conventional force operations within the disputed nation. Intelligence from MACVSOG in support of Operation Rock Crusher was criticized by the conventional force because it lacked tactical value. This was largely due to over-classification, but lack of coordination between MACVSOG and MACV is also a factor. A communication/intelligence bridge between the two would have helped fill intelligence gaps for the conventional forces that crossed into Cambodia. Second, conventional force operations can help create diversions to support cross-border raids. Properly coordinated conventional force operations can mask short duration cross-border strikes. The Soviets conducted focused strikes inside Pakistan under the veil of larger conventional force operations along the border. Similarly, the British successfully hid larger scope border operations with regular PSYOP over flights to mask bombers supporting operations on the ground.

Short duration operations are most effective in reducing political costs. In all of the case studies except Namibia and to some extent the Cambodia, short duration cross-border raids protected the principal actors from the inevitable political consequences of being labeled an occupying force. Furthermore, in long-duration operations, intent can easily be called into question. Short duration operations allow clearer framing of desired goals and more convincing justifications for strategic messaging.

D. EXTERNAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

External operational-level mitigation techniques are conflict dependent and require a specific focus before, during, and after execution. External operational factors

²⁸³ Hy S. Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 176. Rothstein points out that when SOF become too involved with conventional forces, their ability to work in an “innovative fashion” is diminished by the conventional hierarchy of direct action over unconventional warfare. A balanced separation is required to maintain SOF autonomy, innovation, and influence on indigenous forces.

may include building indigenous intelligence networks, minimizing potentially revealing indicators of cross-border raids, and saturating the environment with false signals.

Building indigenous intelligence networks requires preparation in advance of the cross-border raids. Although it appears there are no direct linkages between indigenous intelligence collection and a specific cross-border operation, the SADF in Namibia utilized UNITA informants in Angola to develop the intelligence picture before and after SADF entered Angola. Indigenous intelligence networks were instrumental in the disposition of forces in all of the case studies. The augmentation of intelligence adds to the information used in weighing the anticipated security gains against the likely political costs. Building indigenous intelligence networks before, during, and after an operation requires an interagency approach.²⁸⁴ Malaya, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Namibia are cases where the indigenous intelligence network actively participated in intelligence collection that led to focused cross-border raids. Indigenous intelligence networks can also help preserve tactical forces by sharing cultural information that can affect the mission.

The use of false signals is akin to nesting cross-border operations within the general conduct of larger operations. The British PSYOP aircraft and the Soviet examples discussed earlier exemplify the use of everyday operations to hide cross-border operations. Simply stated, they demonstrate the utility of deception operations in support of cross-border operations.

During and after cross-border raids it is imperative to prevent “mission creep” and minimize collateral damage. MACVSOG’s mission parameters were fairly well-defined in Vietnam and for the most part it stuck to those specific mission sets. As a result, the political costs of operating within Laos were more easily mitigated through the interagency approach. In contrast, SADF cross-border operations into Angola grew from a few limited engagements to a full blown occupation of a large portion of the country. The SADF case is an extreme example of mission creep, clearly demonstrating how small changes in the mission can snowball if operational success is not held in check.

²⁸⁴ Department of Defense, *Field Manual 3-24.2*, 3-1 – 3-4.

Finally, the issue of collateral damage is best demonstrated in the examples of the French attack on Sakiet and the SADF assault on the SWAPO camp at Cassinga. At Cassinga, collateral damage, measured in civilian deaths and human rights violations, overshadowed the security gains achieved on the ground. In the Sakiet case, the French decided not to use ground forces for fear of political repercussions. In retrospect, using soldiers rather than aerial bombs might have cost less politically. A small number of border violations are often easily dismissed after argumentative but largely benign political rhetoric (e.g., Pakistan and the Soviets).

E. INTERNAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Internal strategic mitigation factors also require a whole-of-government approach. Sound strategic messaging (frame alignment) is imperative in linking the targets to a broader national security goal. In the United States, conflict-specific strategic messaging should complement the National Defense Strategy. In the event of an unexpected conflict, the targets and broader security environment should be defined so they can be supported by all government agencies. Malaya, the Laotian campaign in Vietnam, and Namibia are three instances where broad strategic messaging helped support the interagency approach and created support (albeit temporary) for cross-border operations.

Clearly-defined sanctions against foreign aggressors can justify potential cross-border raids. This will help the domestic legitimacy of over-the-border operations. These political or tactical trigger points provide the most flexibility in the conduct of cross-border raids when they are defined early in the conflict or properly framed when preceding a projected cross-border operation. An example where punishment for noncompliance affected political costs is the Sakiet raid and the forced grounding of the aircraft transporting FLN leadership. If France had properly articulated the punishment for supporting insurgents, its cross-border operations may have been seen as legitimate limited encroachments onto foreign soil; this narrative might have had a positive effect on domestic public opinion.

During cross-border operations, the government should maintain political will through information operations justifying cross-border raids from a strategic perspective. This can be accomplished by presenting the positive impact of cross-border operations on

the counterinsurgency and on regional or global security. The SEATO agreement was used in both Malaya and Vietnam to frame operations inside Thailand and Laos. The leveraging of SEATO helped justify international cooperation in combating insurgents in nations outside the core disputed areas, presenting the conflict in a manner designed to influence domestic public support.

F. EXTERNAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

External strategic political cost moderation requires ongoing, focused political and military activities before and during conflict. Cooperation from neighboring countries may involve a continuum of measures, from discreet concessions to active assistance with border security. Diplomatic activities at the strategic level are necessary to gain compliance. The SEATO agreement produced active Thai backing for both the British and American wars in Southeast Asia. The United States' interagency approach in Laos was quite effective. There, CIA and MACVSOG units planned and executed operations with the approval of the U.S. ambassador, who coordinated with the Laotian leadership. Operational approval by the ambassador may not be appropriate in every circumstance, but at minimum the Ambassador's input should be recognized so that Embassy efforts are appropriately aligned. Political cost mitigation occurs at all levels of government; the most influential persons do not necessarily hold the highest rank.

International diplomacy is not limited to compliance from neighboring nations. Diplomacy can also help reduce the potential for sanctions or mitigate their effects. The U.S. imposed major sanctions on the South African government that seriously impacted its ability to wage war. Had South Africa expended more resources to build its case to the international audience, it might have held on to U.S. support or created opportunities for material support from other nations, but this is unlikely due to South Africa's internal policy of apartheid.²⁸⁵ The Sandinistas had to do just that: after they were denied aid from the United States, they found support from their less preferred option, the Soviet Union.

²⁸⁵ Jannie Geldenhuys, *At the Front: A General's Account of South Africa's Border War* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers [PTY] LTD, 2009), 333–334.

Diplomacy is also essential for attempts to block or disrupt support or aid from a sympathetic state—"broad containment." Broad containment can reduce a states' ability to support insurgency in neighboring countries. The French in Algeria demonstrated small scale containment, but failed to expand the concept to neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. The French should have made greater efforts to diplomatically isolate Tunisia and Morocco. South Africa failed to diplomatically isolate Angola; the result was an escalation of hostilities and the transfer of new weaponry to the Angolan military. The Angolan case called for isolating Angola from Soviet-backed Cuba. The South African government had difficulty framing its expansive military policies as purely anti-Soviet because their policies were perceived as racially motivated.

Occupation can negate even the best strategic messaging. South Africa's occupation of Angola demonstrates that no strategic message can overcome the political costs of occupation. The two month-old Cambodian campaign undermined the U.S. strategic message about its role in Vietnam. Occupying governments must justify expanding the war. The loss of blood and treasure will be immediately questioned at home, and the occupation often focuses additional attention on the counterinsurgency being fought elsewhere. Short duration operations negate many arguments of occupation, but if not properly managed—if, for example, there is mission creep—even short-duration operations may be perceived war expansion. Cross-border raids can continue for years, as in Laos, if they are properly managed, coordinated, and signaled.

G. RECOMMENDATIONS

The complex political and military dynamics of the Cold War influenced all the insurgencies discussed in this thesis. Either the United States or the Soviet Union provided the bulk of the material to most of the insurgents; more often than not, either the United States or the Soviet Union imposed the greatest international political costs on cross-border operations. As small nations assert stronger cases for sovereignty in the post-Cold War world, most lessons from the cases examined in this thesis remain relevant. The United States, the only remaining superpower, must decide how to interact with weaker nations when cross-border operations are deemed necessary to national security.

The investment in indigenous intelligence networks complements the current posture of United States SOF around the globe.²⁸⁶ An interagency approach will establish an environment conducive to conducting cross-border operations should the need arise because “effective networks are best created before a crisis.”²⁸⁷ Furthermore, investing in an interagency approach to foreign cooperation before hostilities occur will allow the U.S. to more effectively leverage international support, thus reducing the political costs of controversial operations like cross-border raids and combined operations in a counterterrorism setting. Investments at both the operational and strategic levels will produce the greatest results.

Dedicated raiding units require dedicated investments in personnel and material. Such units can include SOF or specially trained conventional forces. In Vietnam, the Green Berets’ unconventional warfare training made their operations effective; the dynamics of current covert Special Missions Units are different. Decision makers should be cautious about investing too much in direct action. Overemphasis on direct action raids, cross-border and otherwise, has a negative effect on public opinion in counterinsurgency settings. The Green Berets’ value in Vietnam came from their skill at unconventional warfare as well as their direct action missions.²⁸⁸ Units specializing in direct action are not ideal for unconventional warfare settings. To maintain flexibility in the operating environment and prevent overreliance on any one specialty or approach to conflict, the military should recognize that some operational tasks, including unconventional warfare operations, require unique skill sets.

The whole-of-government/interagency approach is necessary for framing the narrative of conflict to reduce the political costs of cross-border raids. Information operations associated with cross-border raids should emphasize the larger security context. It is not necessary that the narrative reveal covert operations, only that it provide

²⁸⁶ United States Special Operations Command, *Global SOF White Paper, 15 February 2013: The Global Special Operations Forces Network* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013). In response to the changing global security environment, U.S. Special Operations Command is re-posturing forces in collaboration with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), U.S. interagency partners, and international partners.

²⁸⁷ United States Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Command 2020* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), 1.

²⁸⁸ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 175–176.

sound justification should the operations be exposed. With the whole-of-government participation in this paradigm, interagency partners will become more invested in the outcome, and interagency efforts will better complement each other.

In coming years, military and political responses to insurgency, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare will likely include consideration of cross-border raids. Only a small percentage of internal wars end at the negotiating table; most end on the battlefield.²⁸⁹ The lessons learned in the case studies described in this research can help state actors reduce their political cost when securing state victory requires jumping the border.

²⁸⁹ Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007): 321, accessed 21 May 2013, <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=02e4889d-2a2f-4b42-b9f6-1508114e60%40sessionmgr115&vid=2&hid=126>.

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APPENDIX: CASE STUDY SELECTION




Figure 14. Logic for Assignment of Case Outcomes²⁹⁰

²⁹⁰ Paul, Clarke, and Grill, *Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency*, 9.

Insurgency	Start Year	End Year	External Sanctuaries	Cross-Border Raids	Three-Party Rule	Cross-Border Raids Considered	Literature	Result
Greece	1945	1949	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes*Air		Government Wins
Philippines (HUK Rebellion)	1946	1955	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Burma	1948	2006	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Malaya	1948	1960	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Limited	Government Wins
Kenya	1952	1956	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Indonesia (Daru Islam)	1958	1960	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Lebanon	1958	1959	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Tibet	1959	1974	Yes* USA	No	N/A	No		Government Wins
Congo Katanga	1960	1965	No	No	N/A	No		Government Wins
Guatemala	1960	1996	No	No	N/A	No		Government Wins
Iraq Kurdistan	1961	1974	No	No	N/A	No		Government Wins
Uruguay	1963	1973	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Biafran Secession	1967	1970	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Argentina	1968	1979	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Northern Ireland	1969	1999	No	Yes	No	Yes		Government Wins
Jordan	1970	1971	Yes	No	No	Yes	Moderate	Government Wins
Philippines (MNLF)	1971	1996	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Balochistan	1973	1977	No	No	No	No		Government Wins
Angola (UNITA)	1975	2002	Yes	Yes	Yes*Air	Yes	Limited	Government Wins
Morocco	1975	1991	No	No	N/A	Unknown		Government Wins
Indonesia (Aceh)	1976	2005	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Philippines (MILF)	1977	2006	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Peru	1981	1992	No	Yes	No	Yes	Limited	Government Wins
Turkey (PKK)	1984	1999	Yes	No	Yes*Iraq	Yes	Moderate	Government Wins
Uganda (ADF)	1986	2000	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Sierra Leone	1991	2002	Yes	Yes* Air	Yes	Yes	Moderate	Government Wins
Algeria (GIA)	1992	2004	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Croatia	1992	1995	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Wins
Colombia (La Violencia)	1948	1962	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Yemen	1962	1970	Yes	No	No	Yes	Limited	Mixed Outcome
Dominican Republic	1965	1966	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
East Timor	1975	2000	Yes	No	N/A	No		Mixed Outcome
Lebanese Civil War	1975	1990	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Limited	Mixed Outcome
Mozambique (RENAMO)	1976	1995	No	Yes*	Yes*	Yes	Limited	Mixed Outcome
Kampuchea	1978	1992	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Moderate	Mixed Outcome
El Salvador	1979	1992	No	No	N/A	Unknown		Mixed Outcome
Senegal	1980	2002	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Nicaragua (Contras)	1981	1990	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes*provoked	Limited	Mixed Outcome
Papua New Guinea	1988	1998	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Bosnia	1992	1995	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Georgia Abkhazia	1992	1994	Yes	No	N/A	No		Mixed Outcome
Nagorno-Karabakh	1992	1994	No	Yes	No	No		Mixed Outcome
Tajikistan	1992	1997	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Burundi	1993	2003	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Chechnya I	1994	1996	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Kosovo	1996	1999	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Limited	Mixed Outcome
Nepal	1997	2006	No	No	N/A	N/A		Mixed Outcome
Congo (anti-Kabila)	1998	2003	Yes	No	No	No		Mixed Outcome
China	1934	1950	No	No	No	No		Government Loses
Indochina	1946	1954	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes	Moderate	Government Loses
Cuba	1953	1959	Yes	No	N/A	No		Government Loses
Algerian Independence	1954	1962	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Moderate	Government Loses
Eritrea	1960	1993	No	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Laos	1960	1975	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes*	Moderate	Government Loses
Namibia	1960	1989	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Limited	Government Loses
South Africa	1960	1994	No	No	N/A	N/A		Government Loses
South Vietnam	1960	1975	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Moderate	Government Loses
Angolan Independence	1962	1974	Yes	No	N/A	Unknown		Government Loses
Guinea-Bissau	1962	1974	Yes	Yes	No	Yes		Government Loses

Mozambique Independence	1962	1974	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Limited	Government Loses
Zimbabwe	1965	1980	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Cambodia	1968	1975	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Bangladesh	1971	1972	Yes	Yes	No	Yes		Government Loses
Afghanistan (Soviet)	1978	1992	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Government Loses
Nicaragua	1978	1979	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Somalia	1980	1991	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Sudan (SPLA)	1984	2004	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Liberia	1989	1997	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Moldova	1990	1992	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Rwanda	1990	1994	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Afghanistan (post-Soviet)	1992	1996	No	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Afghanistan (Taliban)	1996	2001	Yes	No	No	Unknown		Government Loses
Zaire (anti-Mobutu)	1996	1997	No	No	No	N/A		Government Loses
Colombia (FARC)	1963	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Philippines (NPA)	1969	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
India Northeast	1975	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Sri Lanka	1976	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
India-Naxalite	1980	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Uganda (LRA)	1987	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Kashmir	1989	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Nigeria (Niger Delta)	1991	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Somalian (post-Barre)	1991	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Chechnya II	1999	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Israel	2000	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Afghanistan (anti-Coalition)	2001	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Ivory Coast	2002	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Darfur	2003	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
Iraq	2003	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided
South Thailand	2004	Ongoing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Undecided

Table 9. The 89 Insurgencies and Case Selection Criteria

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